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Diffstat (limited to 'jython-tosca-parser/src/main/resources/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py')
| -rw-r--r-- | jython-tosca-parser/src/main/resources/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py | 390 |
1 files changed, 390 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/jython-tosca-parser/src/main/resources/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py b/jython-tosca-parser/src/main/resources/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9bda15 --- /dev/null +++ b/jython-tosca-parser/src/main/resources/Lib/site-packages/pip/_vendor/requests/packages/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py @@ -0,0 +1,390 @@ +'''SSL with SNI_-support for Python 2. + +This needs the following packages installed: + +* pyOpenSSL (tested with 0.13) +* ndg-httpsclient (tested with 0.3.2) +* pyasn1 (tested with 0.1.6) + +To activate it call :func:`~urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3`. +This can be done in a ``sitecustomize`` module, or at any other time before +your application begins using ``urllib3``, like this:: + + try: + import urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl + urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3() + except ImportError: + pass + +Now you can use :mod:`urllib3` as you normally would, and it will support SNI +when the required modules are installed. + +Activating this module also has the positive side effect of disabling SSL/TLS +encryption in Python 2 (see `CRIME attack`_). + +If you want to configure the default list of supported cipher suites, you can +set the ``urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.DEFAULT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST`` variable. + +Module Variables +---------------- + +:var DEFAULT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST: The list of supported SSL/TLS cipher suites. + Default: ``EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 + EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+RC4 EDH+aRSA EECDH RC4 !aNULL !eNULL !LOW !3DES + !MD5 !EXP !PSK !SRP !DSS'`` + +.. _sni: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication +.. _crime attack: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) + +''' + +from ndg.httpsclient.ssl_peer_verification import SUBJ_ALT_NAME_SUPPORT +from ndg.httpsclient.subj_alt_name import SubjectAltName as BaseSubjectAltName +import OpenSSL.SSL +from pyasn1.codec.der import decoder as der_decoder +from pyasn1.type import univ, constraint +from socket import _fileobject +import ssl +import select +from cStringIO import StringIO + +from .. import connection +from .. import util + +__all__ = ['inject_into_urllib3', 'extract_from_urllib3'] + +# SNI only *really* works if we can read the subjectAltName of certificates. +HAS_SNI = SUBJ_ALT_NAME_SUPPORT + +# Map from urllib3 to PyOpenSSL compatible parameter-values. +_openssl_versions = { + ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD, + ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv3: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv3_METHOD, + ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1: OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_METHOD, +} +_openssl_verify = { + ssl.CERT_NONE: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_NONE, + ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER, + ssl.CERT_REQUIRED: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER + + OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, +} + +# Default SSL/TLS cipher list. +# Recommendation by https://community.qualys.com/blogs/securitylabs/2013/08/05/ +# configuring-apache-nginx-and-openssl-for-forward-secrecy +DEFAULT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST = 'EECDH+ECDSA+AESGCM EECDH+aRSA+AESGCM ' + \ + 'EECDH+ECDSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+SHA256 EECDH+aRSA+RC4 EDH+aRSA ' + \ + 'EECDH RC4 !aNULL !eNULL !LOW !3DES !MD5 !EXP !PSK !SRP !DSS' + + +orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI +orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket = connection.ssl_wrap_socket + + +def inject_into_urllib3(): + 'Monkey-patch urllib3 with PyOpenSSL-backed SSL-support.' + + connection.ssl_wrap_socket = ssl_wrap_socket + util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI + + +def extract_from_urllib3(): + 'Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`.' + + connection.ssl_wrap_socket = orig_connection_ssl_wrap_socket + util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI + + +### Note: This is a slightly bug-fixed version of same from ndg-httpsclient. +class SubjectAltName(BaseSubjectAltName): + '''ASN.1 implementation for subjectAltNames support''' + + # There is no limit to how many SAN certificates a certificate may have, + # however this needs to have some limit so we'll set an arbitrarily high + # limit. + sizeSpec = univ.SequenceOf.sizeSpec + \ + constraint.ValueSizeConstraint(1, 1024) + + +### Note: This is a slightly bug-fixed version of same from ndg-httpsclient. +def get_subj_alt_name(peer_cert): + # Search through extensions + dns_name = [] + if not SUBJ_ALT_NAME_SUPPORT: + return dns_name + + general_names = SubjectAltName() + for i in range(peer_cert.get_extension_count()): + ext = peer_cert.get_extension(i) + ext_name = ext.get_short_name() + if ext_name != 'subjectAltName': + continue + + # PyOpenSSL returns extension data in ASN.1 encoded form + ext_dat = ext.get_data() + decoded_dat = der_decoder.decode(ext_dat, + asn1Spec=general_names) + + for name in decoded_dat: + if not isinstance(name, SubjectAltName): + continue + for entry in range(len(name)): + component = name.getComponentByPosition(entry) + if component.getName() != 'dNSName': + continue + dns_name.append(str(component.getComponent())) + + return dns_name + + +class fileobject(_fileobject): + + def read(self, size=-1): + # Use max, disallow tiny reads in a loop as they are very inefficient. + # We never leave read() with any leftover data from a new recv() call + # in our internal buffer. + rbufsize = max(self._rbufsize, self.default_bufsize) + # Our use of StringIO rather than lists of string objects returned by + # recv() minimizes memory usage and fragmentation that occurs when + # rbufsize is large compared to the typical return value of recv(). + buf = self._rbuf + buf.seek(0, 2) # seek end + if size < 0: + # Read until EOF + self._rbuf = StringIO() # reset _rbuf. we consume it via buf. + while True: + try: + data = self._sock.recv(rbufsize) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + continue + if not data: + break + buf.write(data) + return buf.getvalue() + else: + # Read until size bytes or EOF seen, whichever comes first + buf_len = buf.tell() + if buf_len >= size: + # Already have size bytes in our buffer? Extract and return. + buf.seek(0) + rv = buf.read(size) + self._rbuf = StringIO() + self._rbuf.write(buf.read()) + return rv + + self._rbuf = StringIO() # reset _rbuf. we consume it via buf. + while True: + left = size - buf_len + # recv() will malloc the amount of memory given as its + # parameter even though it often returns much less data + # than that. The returned data string is short lived + # as we copy it into a StringIO and free it. This avoids + # fragmentation issues on many platforms. + try: + data = self._sock.recv(left) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + continue + if not data: + break + n = len(data) + if n == size and not buf_len: + # Shortcut. Avoid buffer data copies when: + # - We have no data in our buffer. + # AND + # - Our call to recv returned exactly the + # number of bytes we were asked to read. + return data + if n == left: + buf.write(data) + del data # explicit free + break + assert n <= left, "recv(%d) returned %d bytes" % (left, n) + buf.write(data) + buf_len += n + del data # explicit free + #assert buf_len == buf.tell() + return buf.getvalue() + + def readline(self, size=-1): + buf = self._rbuf + buf.seek(0, 2) # seek end + if buf.tell() > 0: + # check if we already have it in our buffer + buf.seek(0) + bline = buf.readline(size) + if bline.endswith('\n') or len(bline) == size: + self._rbuf = StringIO() + self._rbuf.write(buf.read()) + return bline + del bline + if size < 0: + # Read until \n or EOF, whichever comes first + if self._rbufsize <= 1: + # Speed up unbuffered case + buf.seek(0) + buffers = [buf.read()] + self._rbuf = StringIO() # reset _rbuf. we consume it via buf. + data = None + recv = self._sock.recv + while True: + try: + while data != "\n": + data = recv(1) + if not data: + break + buffers.append(data) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + continue + break + return "".join(buffers) + + buf.seek(0, 2) # seek end + self._rbuf = StringIO() # reset _rbuf. we consume it via buf. + while True: + try: + data = self._sock.recv(self._rbufsize) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + continue + if not data: + break + nl = data.find('\n') + if nl >= 0: + nl += 1 + buf.write(data[:nl]) + self._rbuf.write(data[nl:]) + del data + break + buf.write(data) + return buf.getvalue() + else: + # Read until size bytes or \n or EOF seen, whichever comes first + buf.seek(0, 2) # seek end + buf_len = buf.tell() + if buf_len >= size: + buf.seek(0) + rv = buf.read(size) + self._rbuf = StringIO() + self._rbuf.write(buf.read()) + return rv + self._rbuf = StringIO() # reset _rbuf. we consume it via buf. + while True: + try: + data = self._sock.recv(self._rbufsize) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + continue + if not data: + break + left = size - buf_len + # did we just receive a newline? + nl = data.find('\n', 0, left) + if nl >= 0: + nl += 1 + # save the excess data to _rbuf + self._rbuf.write(data[nl:]) + if buf_len: + buf.write(data[:nl]) + break + else: + # Shortcut. Avoid data copy through buf when returning + # a substring of our first recv(). + return data[:nl] + n = len(data) + if n == size and not buf_len: + # Shortcut. Avoid data copy through buf when + # returning exactly all of our first recv(). + return data + if n >= left: + buf.write(data[:left]) + self._rbuf.write(data[left:]) + break + buf.write(data) + buf_len += n + #assert buf_len == buf.tell() + return buf.getvalue() + + +class WrappedSocket(object): + '''API-compatibility wrapper for Python OpenSSL's Connection-class.''' + + def __init__(self, connection, socket): + self.connection = connection + self.socket = socket + + def fileno(self): + return self.socket.fileno() + + def makefile(self, mode, bufsize=-1): + return fileobject(self.connection, mode, bufsize) + + def settimeout(self, timeout): + return self.socket.settimeout(timeout) + + def sendall(self, data): + return self.connection.sendall(data) + + def close(self): + return self.connection.shutdown() + + def getpeercert(self, binary_form=False): + x509 = self.connection.get_peer_certificate() + + if not x509: + return x509 + + if binary_form: + return OpenSSL.crypto.dump_certificate( + OpenSSL.crypto.FILETYPE_ASN1, + x509) + + return { + 'subject': ( + (('commonName', x509.get_subject().CN),), + ), + 'subjectAltName': [ + ('DNS', value) + for value in get_subj_alt_name(x509) + ] + } + + +def _verify_callback(cnx, x509, err_no, err_depth, return_code): + return err_no == 0 + + +def ssl_wrap_socket(sock, keyfile=None, certfile=None, cert_reqs=None, + ca_certs=None, server_hostname=None, + ssl_version=None): + ctx = OpenSSL.SSL.Context(_openssl_versions[ssl_version]) + if certfile: + ctx.use_certificate_file(certfile) + if keyfile: + ctx.use_privatekey_file(keyfile) + if cert_reqs != ssl.CERT_NONE: + ctx.set_verify(_openssl_verify[cert_reqs], _verify_callback) + if ca_certs: + try: + ctx.load_verify_locations(ca_certs, None) + except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: + raise ssl.SSLError('bad ca_certs: %r' % ca_certs, e) + + # Disable TLS compression to migitate CRIME attack (issue #309) + OP_NO_COMPRESSION = 0x20000 + ctx.set_options(OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + + # Set list of supported ciphersuites. + ctx.set_cipher_list(DEFAULT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST) + + cnx = OpenSSL.SSL.Connection(ctx, sock) + cnx.set_tlsext_host_name(server_hostname) + cnx.set_connect_state() + while True: + try: + cnx.do_handshake() + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + select.select([sock], [], []) + continue + except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: + raise ssl.SSLError('bad handshake', e) + break + + return WrappedSocket(cnx, sock) |