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-/**
- * @license AngularJS v1.5.0
- * (c) 2010-2016 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org
- * License: MIT
- */
-(function(window, angular, undefined) {'use strict';
-
-/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. *
- * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. *
- * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying *
- * this file is required. *
- * *
- * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? *
- * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? *
- * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? *
- * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */
-
-var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize');
-
-/**
- * @ngdoc module
- * @name ngSanitize
- * @description
- *
- * # ngSanitize
- *
- * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML.
- *
- *
- * <div doc-module-components="ngSanitize"></div>
- *
- * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage.
- */
-
-/**
- * @ngdoc service
- * @name $sanitize
- * @kind function
- *
- * @description
- * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens.
- *
- * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are
- * then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make
- * it into the returned string.
- *
- * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions
- * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider
- * `$compileProvider`}.
- *
- * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}.
- *
- * @param {string} html HTML input.
- * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML.
- *
- * @example
- <example module="sanitizeExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js">
- <file name="index.html">
- <script>
- angular.module('sanitizeExample', ['ngSanitize'])
- .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', '$sce', function($scope, $sce) {
- $scope.snippet =
- '<p style="color:blue">an html\n' +
- '<em onmouseover="this.textContent=\'PWN3D!\'">click here</em>\n' +
- 'snippet</p>';
- $scope.deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet = function() {
- return $sce.trustAsHtml($scope.snippet);
- };
- }]);
- </script>
- <div ng-controller="ExampleController">
- Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>
- <table>
- <tr>
- <td>Directive</td>
- <td>How</td>
- <td>Source</td>
- <td>Rendered</td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="bind-html-with-sanitize">
- <td>ng-bind-html</td>
- <td>Automatically uses $sanitize</td>
- <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
- <td><div ng-bind-html="snippet"></div></td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="bind-html-with-trust">
- <td>ng-bind-html</td>
- <td>Bypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value</td>
- <td>
- <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"&gt;
-&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
- </td>
- <td><div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()"></div></td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="bind-default">
- <td>ng-bind</td>
- <td>Automatically escapes</td>
- <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br/>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
- <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>
- </tr>
- </table>
- </div>
- </file>
- <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">
- it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() {
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getInnerHtml()).
- toBe('<p>an html\n<em>click here</em>\nsnippet</p>');
- });
-
- it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() {
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getInnerHtml()).
- toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" +
- "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" +
- "snippet</p>");
- });
-
- it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() {
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getInnerHtml()).
- toBe("&lt;p style=\"color:blue\"&gt;an html\n" +
- "&lt;em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\"&gt;click here&lt;/em&gt;\n" +
- "snippet&lt;/p&gt;");
- });
-
- it('should update', function() {
- element(by.model('snippet')).clear();
- element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getInnerHtml()).
- toBe('new <b>text</b>');
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getInnerHtml()).toBe(
- 'new <b onclick="alert(1)">text</b>');
- expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getInnerHtml()).toBe(
- "new &lt;b onclick=\"alert(1)\"&gt;text&lt;/b&gt;");
- });
- </file>
- </example>
- */
-
-
-/**
- * @ngdoc provider
- * @name $sanitizeProvider
- *
- * @description
- * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance.
- */
-function $SanitizeProvider() {
- var svgEnabled = false;
-
- this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) {
- if (svgEnabled) {
- angular.extend(validElements, svgElements);
- }
- return function(html) {
- var buf = [];
- htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) {
- return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage));
- }));
- return buf.join('');
- };
- }];
-
-
- /**
- * @ngdoc method
- * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg
- * @kind function
- *
- * @description
- * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer.
- *
- * <div class="alert alert-warning">
- * <p>By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your
- * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned
- * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login
- * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.</p>
- *
- * <p>To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg
- * tags within the sanitized content:</p>
- *
- * <br>
- *
- * <pre><code>
- * .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {
- * overflow: hidden !important;
- * }
- * </code></pre>
- * </div>
- *
- * @param {boolean=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with.
- * @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called
- * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise.
- */
- this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) {
- if (angular.isDefined(enableSvg)) {
- svgEnabled = enableSvg;
- return this;
- } else {
- return svgEnabled;
- }
- };
-}
-
-function sanitizeText(chars) {
- var buf = [];
- var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, angular.noop);
- writer.chars(chars);
- return buf.join('');
-}
-
-
-// Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes
-var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g,
- // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character)
- NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^\#-~ |!])/g;
-
-
-// Good source of info about elements and attributes
-// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics
-// http://simon.html5.org/html-elements
-
-// Safe Void Elements - HTML5
-// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements
-var voidElements = toMap("area,br,col,hr,img,wbr");
-
-// Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves)
-// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags
-var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap("colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr"),
- optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap("rp,rt"),
- optionalEndTagElements = angular.extend({},
- optionalEndTagInlineElements,
- optionalEndTagBlockElements);
-
-// Safe Block Elements - HTML5
-var blockElements = angular.extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap("address,article," +
- "aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5," +
- "h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul"));
-
-// Inline Elements - HTML5
-var inlineElements = angular.extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap("a,abbr,acronym,b," +
- "bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s," +
- "samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var"));
-
-// SVG Elements
-// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements
-// Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted.
-// They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290
-var svgElements = toMap("circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph," +
- "hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline," +
- "radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan");
-
-// Blocked Elements (will be stripped)
-var blockedElements = toMap("script,style");
-
-var validElements = angular.extend({},
- voidElements,
- blockElements,
- inlineElements,
- optionalEndTagElements);
-
-//Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized
-var uriAttrs = toMap("background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href");
-
-var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' +
- 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' +
- 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' +
- 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' +
- 'valign,value,vspace,width');
-
-// SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes)
-// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes
-var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' +
- 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' +
- 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' +
- 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' +
- 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' +
- 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' +
- 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' +
- 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' +
- 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' +
- 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' +
- 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' +
- 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' +
- 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' +
- 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' +
- 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true);
-
-var validAttrs = angular.extend({},
- uriAttrs,
- svgAttrs,
- htmlAttrs);
-
-function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) {
- var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i;
- for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) {
- obj[lowercaseKeys ? angular.lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true;
- }
- return obj;
-}
-
-var inertBodyElement;
-(function(window) {
- var doc;
- if (window.document && window.document.implementation) {
- doc = window.document.implementation.createHTMLDocument("inert");
- } else {
- throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', "Can't create an inert html document");
- }
- var docElement = doc.documentElement || doc.getDocumentElement();
- var bodyElements = docElement.getElementsByTagName('body');
-
- // usually there should be only one body element in the document, but IE doesn't have any, so we need to create one
- if (bodyElements.length === 1) {
- inertBodyElement = bodyElements[0];
- } else {
- var html = doc.createElement('html');
- inertBodyElement = doc.createElement('body');
- html.appendChild(inertBodyElement);
- doc.appendChild(html);
- }
-})(window);
-
-/**
- * @example
- * htmlParser(htmlString, {
- * start: function(tag, attrs) {},
- * end: function(tag) {},
- * chars: function(text) {},
- * comment: function(text) {}
- * });
- *
- * @param {string} html string
- * @param {object} handler
- */
-function htmlParser(html, handler) {
- if (html === null || html === undefined) {
- html = '';
- } else if (typeof html !== 'string') {
- html = '' + html;
- }
- inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html;
-
- //mXSS protection
- var mXSSAttempts = 5;
- do {
- if (mXSSAttempts === 0) {
- throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', "Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable");
- }
- mXSSAttempts--;
-
- // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11
- if (document.documentMode <= 11) {
- stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement);
- }
- html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; //trigger mXSS
- inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html;
- } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML);
-
- var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild;
- while (node) {
- switch (node.nodeType) {
- case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE
- handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes));
- break;
- case 3: // TEXT NODE
- handler.chars(node.textContent);
- break;
- }
-
- var nextNode;
- if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) {
- if (node.nodeType == 1) {
- handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());
- }
- nextNode = node.nextSibling;
- if (!nextNode) {
- while (nextNode == null) {
- node = node.parentNode;
- if (node === inertBodyElement) break;
- nextNode = node.nextSibling;
- if (node.nodeType == 1) {
- handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase());
- }
- }
- }
- }
- node = nextNode;
- }
-
- while (node = inertBodyElement.firstChild) {
- inertBodyElement.removeChild(node);
- }
-}
-
-function attrToMap(attrs) {
- var map = {};
- for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) {
- var attr = attrs[i];
- map[attr.name] = attr.value;
- }
- return map;
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the
- * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or
- * element text.
- * @param value
- * @returns {string} escaped text
- */
-function encodeEntities(value) {
- return value.
- replace(/&/g, '&amp;').
- replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) {
- var hi = value.charCodeAt(0);
- var low = value.charCodeAt(1);
- return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';';
- }).
- replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) {
- return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';';
- }).
- replace(/</g, '&lt;').
- replace(/>/g, '&gt;');
-}
-
-/**
- * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer
- * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string
- * @returns {object} in the form of {
- * start: function(tag, attrs) {},
- * end: function(tag) {},
- * chars: function(text) {},
- * comment: function(text) {}
- * }
- */
-function htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, uriValidator) {
- var ignoreCurrentElement = false;
- var out = angular.bind(buf, buf.push);
- return {
- start: function(tag, attrs) {
- tag = angular.lowercase(tag);
- if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) {
- ignoreCurrentElement = tag;
- }
- if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) {
- out('<');
- out(tag);
- angular.forEach(attrs, function(value, key) {
- var lkey=angular.lowercase(key);
- var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background');
- if (validAttrs[lkey] === true &&
- (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) {
- out(' ');
- out(key);
- out('="');
- out(encodeEntities(value));
- out('"');
- }
- });
- out('>');
- }
- },
- end: function(tag) {
- tag = angular.lowercase(tag);
- if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) {
- out('</');
- out(tag);
- out('>');
- }
- if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) {
- ignoreCurrentElement = false;
- }
- },
- chars: function(chars) {
- if (!ignoreCurrentElement) {
- out(encodeEntities(chars));
- }
- }
- };
-}
-
-
-/**
- * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare
- * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want
- * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all.
- *
- * @param node Root element to process
- */
-function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) {
- if (node.nodeType === Node.ELEMENT_NODE) {
- var attrs = node.attributes;
- for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) {
- var attrNode = attrs[i];
- var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase();
- if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.indexOf('ns1:') === 0) {
- node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode);
- i--;
- l--;
- }
- }
- }
-
- var nextNode = node.firstChild;
- if (nextNode) {
- stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode);
- }
-
- nextNode = node.nextSibling;
- if (nextNode) {
- stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode);
- }
-}
-
-
-
-// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service
-angular.module('ngSanitize', []).provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider);
-
-/* global sanitizeText: false */
-
-/**
- * @ngdoc filter
- * @name linky
- * @kind function
- *
- * @description
- * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/mailto` and
- * plain email address links.
- *
- * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed.
- *
- * @param {string} text Input text.
- * @param {string} target Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in.
- * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element.
- *
- * Can be one of:
- *
- * - `object`: A map of attributes
- * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes
- *
- * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of
- * the target parameter.
- *
- *
- * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text.
- *
- * @usage
- <span ng-bind-html="linky_expression | linky"></span>
- *
- * @example
- <example module="linkyExample" deps="angular-sanitize.js">
- <file name="index.html">
- <div ng-controller="ExampleController">
- Snippet: <textarea ng-model="snippet" cols="60" rows="3"></textarea>
- <table>
- <tr>
- <th>Filter</th>
- <th>Source</th>
- <th>Rendered</th>
- </tr>
- <tr id="linky-filter">
- <td>linky filter</td>
- <td>
- <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
- </td>
- <td>
- <div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky"></div>
- </td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="linky-target">
- <td>linky target</td>
- <td>
- <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
- </td>
- <td>
- <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'"></div>
- </td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="linky-custom-attributes">
- <td>linky custom attributes</td>
- <td>
- <pre>&lt;div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre>
- </td>
- <td>
- <div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}"></div>
- </td>
- </tr>
- <tr id="escaped-html">
- <td>no filter</td>
- <td><pre>&lt;div ng-bind="snippet"&gt;<br>&lt;/div&gt;</pre></td>
- <td><div ng-bind="snippet"></div></td>
- </tr>
- </table>
- </file>
- <file name="script.js">
- angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize'])
- .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) {
- $scope.snippet =
- 'Pretty text with some links:\n'+
- 'http://angularjs.org/,\n'+
- 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n'+
- 'another@somewhere.org,\n'+
- 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.';
- $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/';
- }]);
- </file>
- <file name="protractor.js" type="protractor">
- it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() {
- expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).
- toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' +
- 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');
- expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4);
- });
-
- it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() {
- expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()).
- toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' +
- 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.');
- expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0);
- });
-
- it('should update', function() {
- element(by.model('snippet')).clear();
- element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.');
- expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()).
- toBe('new http://link.');
- expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1);
- expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText())
- .toBe('new http://link.');
- });
-
- it('should work with the target property', function() {
- expect(element(by.id('linky-target')).
- element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()).
- toBe('http://angularjs.org/');
- expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank');
- });
-
- it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() {
- expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')).
- element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()).
- toBe('http://angularjs.org/');
- expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow');
- });
- </file>
- </example>
- */
-angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) {
- var LINKY_URL_REGEXP =
- /((ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i,
- MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i;
-
- var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky');
- var isString = angular.isString;
-
- return function(text, target, attributes) {
- if (text == null || text === '') return text;
- if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text);
-
- var match;
- var raw = text;
- var html = [];
- var url;
- var i;
- while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) {
- // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence
- url = match[0];
- // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto
- if (!match[2] && !match[4]) {
- url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url;
- }
- i = match.index;
- addText(raw.substr(0, i));
- addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, ''));
- raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length);
- }
- addText(raw);
- return $sanitize(html.join(''));
-
- function addText(text) {
- if (!text) {
- return;
- }
- html.push(sanitizeText(text));
- }
-
- function addLink(url, text) {
- var key;
- html.push('<a ');
- if (angular.isFunction(attributes)) {
- attributes = attributes(url);
- }
- if (angular.isObject(attributes)) {
- for (key in attributes) {
- html.push(key + '="' + attributes[key] + '" ');
- }
- } else {
- attributes = {};
- }
- if (angular.isDefined(target) && !('target' in attributes)) {
- html.push('target="',
- target,
- '" ');
- }
- html.push('href="',
- url.replace(/"/g, '&quot;'),
- '">');
- addText(text);
- html.push('</a>');
- }
- };
-}]);
-
-
-})(window, window.angular);