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authorKotta, Shireesha (sk434m) <sk434m@att.com>2019-06-13 14:41:15 -0400
committerKotta, Shireesha (sk434m) <sk434m@att.com>2019-06-17 15:51:28 -0400
commitb75f35b0a1824aab32b4329fa62076b0f0307853 (patch)
tree97582ed38384d8a9b984107522440aa126130cd6 /ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external
parent4027435c28e1433df2476b83a6e77ba4d1d865bd (diff)
Application Onboarding page changes
Issue-ID: PORTAL-644 Application Onboarding page changes , DB scripts Change-Id: Id689e15f5abd56192420e6761440659531108ab4 Signed-off-by: Kotta, Shireesha (sk434m) <sk434m@att.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external')
-rw-r--r--ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external/utils/purify.js1131
1 files changed, 1131 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external/utils/purify.js b/ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external/utils/purify.js
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8627b977
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ecomp-portal-FE-common/client/bower_components_external/utils/purify.js
@@ -0,0 +1,1131 @@
+(function (global, factory) {
+ typeof exports === 'object' && typeof module !== 'undefined' ? module.exports = factory() :
+ typeof define === 'function' && define.amd ? define(factory) :
+ (global.DOMPurify = factory());
+}(this, (function () { 'use strict';
+
+var freeze$1 = Object.freeze || function (x) {
+ return x;
+};
+
+var html = freeze$1(['a', 'abbr', 'acronym', 'address', 'area', 'article', 'aside', 'audio', 'b', 'bdi', 'bdo', 'big', 'blink', 'blockquote', 'body', 'br', 'button', 'canvas', 'caption', 'center', 'cite', 'code', 'col', 'colgroup', 'content', 'data', 'datalist', 'dd', 'decorator', 'del', 'details', 'dfn', 'dir', 'div', 'dl', 'dt', 'element', 'em', 'fieldset', 'figcaption', 'figure', 'font', 'footer', 'form', 'h1', 'h2', 'h3', 'h4', 'h5', 'h6', 'head', 'header', 'hgroup', 'hr', 'html', 'i', 'img', 'input', 'ins', 'kbd', 'label', 'legend', 'li', 'main', 'map', 'mark', 'marquee', 'menu', 'menuitem', 'meter', 'nav', 'nobr', 'ol', 'optgroup', 'option', 'output', 'p', 'pre', 'progress', 'q', 'rp', 'rt', 'ruby', 's', 'samp', 'section', 'select', 'shadow', 'small', 'source', 'spacer', 'span', 'strike', 'strong', 'style', 'sub', 'summary', 'sup', 'table', 'tbody', 'td', 'template', 'textarea', 'tfoot', 'th', 'thead', 'time', 'tr', 'track', 'tt', 'u', 'ul', 'var', 'video', 'wbr']);
+
+// SVG
+var svg = freeze$1(['svg', 'a', 'altglyph', 'altglyphdef', 'altglyphitem', 'animatecolor', 'animatemotion', 'animatetransform', 'audio', 'canvas', 'circle', 'clippath', 'defs', 'desc', 'ellipse', 'filter', 'font', 'g', 'glyph', 'glyphref', 'hkern', 'image', 'line', 'lineargradient', 'marker', 'mask', 'metadata', 'mpath', 'path', 'pattern', 'polygon', 'polyline', 'radialgradient', 'rect', 'stop', 'style', 'switch', 'symbol', 'text', 'textpath', 'title', 'tref', 'tspan', 'video', 'view', 'vkern']);
+
+var svgFilters = freeze$1(['feBlend', 'feColorMatrix', 'feComponentTransfer', 'feComposite', 'feConvolveMatrix', 'feDiffuseLighting', 'feDisplacementMap', 'feDistantLight', 'feFlood', 'feFuncA', 'feFuncB', 'feFuncG', 'feFuncR', 'feGaussianBlur', 'feMerge', 'feMergeNode', 'feMorphology', 'feOffset', 'fePointLight', 'feSpecularLighting', 'feSpotLight', 'feTile', 'feTurbulence']);
+
+var mathMl = freeze$1(['math', 'menclose', 'merror', 'mfenced', 'mfrac', 'mglyph', 'mi', 'mlabeledtr', 'mmultiscripts', 'mn', 'mo', 'mover', 'mpadded', 'mphantom', 'mroot', 'mrow', 'ms', 'mspace', 'msqrt', 'mstyle', 'msub', 'msup', 'msubsup', 'mtable', 'mtd', 'mtext', 'mtr', 'munder', 'munderover']);
+
+var text = freeze$1(['#text']);
+
+var freeze$2 = Object.freeze || function (x) {
+ return x;
+};
+
+var html$1 = freeze$2(['accept', 'action', 'align', 'alt', 'autocomplete', 'background', 'bgcolor', 'border', 'cellpadding', 'cellspacing', 'checked', 'cite', 'class', 'clear', 'color', 'cols', 'colspan', 'coords', 'crossorigin', 'datetime', 'default', 'dir', 'disabled', 'download', 'enctype', 'face', 'for', 'headers', 'height', 'hidden', 'high', 'href', 'hreflang', 'id', 'integrity', 'ismap', 'label', 'lang', 'list', 'loop', 'low', 'max', 'maxlength', 'media', 'method', 'min', 'multiple', 'name', 'noshade', 'novalidate', 'nowrap', 'open', 'optimum', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'poster', 'preload', 'pubdate', 'radiogroup', 'readonly', 'rel', 'required', 'rev', 'reversed', 'role', 'rows', 'rowspan', 'spellcheck', 'scope', 'selected', 'shape', 'size', 'sizes', 'span', 'srclang', 'start', 'src', 'srcset', 'step', 'style', 'summary', 'tabindex', 'title', 'type', 'usemap', 'valign', 'value', 'width', 'xmlns']);
+
+var svg$1 = freeze$2(['accent-height', 'accumulate', 'additive', 'alignment-baseline', 'ascent', 'attributename', 'attributetype', 'azimuth', 'basefrequency', 'baseline-shift', 'begin', 'bias', 'by', 'class', 'clip', 'clip-path', 'clip-rule', 'color', 'color-interpolation', 'color-interpolation-filters', 'color-profile', 'color-rendering', 'cx', 'cy', 'd', 'dx', 'dy', 'diffuseconstant', 'direction', 'display', 'divisor', 'dur', 'edgemode', 'elevation', 'end', 'fill', 'fill-opacity', 'fill-rule', 'filter', 'flood-color', 'flood-opacity', 'font-family', 'font-size', 'font-size-adjust', 'font-stretch', 'font-style', 'font-variant', 'font-weight', 'fx', 'fy', 'g1', 'g2', 'glyph-name', 'glyphref', 'gradientunits', 'gradienttransform', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'image-rendering', 'in', 'in2', 'k', 'k1', 'k2', 'k3', 'k4', 'kerning', 'keypoints', 'keysplines', 'keytimes', 'lang', 'lengthadjust', 'letter-spacing', 'kernelmatrix', 'kernelunitlength', 'lighting-color', 'local', 'marker-end', 'marker-mid', 'marker-start', 'markerheight', 'markerunits', 'markerwidth', 'maskcontentunits', 'maskunits', 'max', 'mask', 'media', 'method', 'mode', 'min', 'name', 'numoctaves', 'offset', 'operator', 'opacity', 'order', 'orient', 'orientation', 'origin', 'overflow', 'paint-order', 'path', 'pathlength', 'patterncontentunits', 'patterntransform', 'patternunits', 'points', 'preservealpha', 'preserveaspectratio', 'r', 'rx', 'ry', 'radius', 'refx', 'refy', 'repeatcount', 'repeatdur', 'restart', 'result', 'rotate', 'scale', 'seed', 'shape-rendering', 'specularconstant', 'specularexponent', 'spreadmethod', 'stddeviation', 'stitchtiles', 'stop-color', 'stop-opacity', 'stroke-dasharray', 'stroke-dashoffset', 'stroke-linecap', 'stroke-linejoin', 'stroke-miterlimit', 'stroke-opacity', 'stroke', 'stroke-width', 'style', 'surfacescale', 'tabindex', 'targetx', 'targety', 'transform', 'text-anchor', 'text-decoration', 'text-rendering', 'textlength', 'type', 'u1', 'u2', 'unicode', 'values', 'viewbox', 'visibility', 'vert-adv-y', 'vert-origin-x', 'vert-origin-y', 'width', 'word-spacing', 'wrap', 'writing-mode', 'xchannelselector', 'ychannelselector', 'x', 'x1', 'x2', 'xmlns', 'y', 'y1', 'y2', 'z', 'zoomandpan']);
+
+var mathMl$1 = freeze$2(['accent', 'accentunder', 'align', 'bevelled', 'close', 'columnsalign', 'columnlines', 'columnspan', 'denomalign', 'depth', 'dir', 'display', 'displaystyle', 'fence', 'frame', 'height', 'href', 'id', 'largeop', 'length', 'linethickness', 'lspace', 'lquote', 'mathbackground', 'mathcolor', 'mathsize', 'mathvariant', 'maxsize', 'minsize', 'movablelimits', 'notation', 'numalign', 'open', 'rowalign', 'rowlines', 'rowspacing', 'rowspan', 'rspace', 'rquote', 'scriptlevel', 'scriptminsize', 'scriptsizemultiplier', 'selection', 'separator', 'separators', 'stretchy', 'subscriptshift', 'supscriptshift', 'symmetric', 'voffset', 'width', 'xmlns']);
+
+var xml = freeze$2(['xlink:href', 'xml:id', 'xlink:title', 'xml:space', 'xmlns:xlink']);
+
+var hasOwnProperty = Object.hasOwnProperty;
+var setPrototypeOf = Object.setPrototypeOf;
+
+var _ref$1 = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect;
+var apply$1 = _ref$1.apply;
+
+if (!apply$1) {
+ apply$1 = function apply(fun, thisValue, args) {
+ return fun.apply(thisValue, args);
+ };
+}
+
+/* Add properties to a lookup table */
+function addToSet(set, array) {
+ if (setPrototypeOf) {
+ // Make 'in' and truthy checks like Boolean(set.constructor)
+ // independent of any properties defined on Object.prototype.
+ // Prevent prototype setters from intercepting set as a this value.
+ setPrototypeOf(set, null);
+ }
+ var l = array.length;
+ while (l--) {
+ var element = array[l];
+ if (typeof element === 'string') {
+ var lcElement = element.toLowerCase();
+ if (lcElement !== element) {
+ array[l] = lcElement;
+ element = lcElement;
+ }
+ }
+ set[element] = true;
+ }
+ return set;
+}
+
+/* Shallow clone an object */
+function clone(object) {
+ var newObject = {};
+ var property = void 0;
+ for (property in object) {
+ if (apply$1(hasOwnProperty, object, [property])) {
+ newObject[property] = object[property];
+ }
+ }
+ return newObject;
+}
+
+var seal = Object.seal || function (x) {
+ return x;
+};
+
+var MUSTACHE_EXPR = seal(/\{\{[\s\S]*|[\s\S]*\}\}/gm); // Specify template detection regex for SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES mode
+var ERB_EXPR = seal(/<%[\s\S]*|[\s\S]*%>/gm);
+var DATA_ATTR = seal(/^data-[\-\w.\u00B7-\uFFFF]/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
+var ARIA_ATTR = seal(/^aria-[\-\w]+$/); // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
+var IS_ALLOWED_URI = seal(/^(?:(?:(?:f|ht)tps?|mailto|tel|callto|cid|xmpp):|[^a-z]|[a-z+.\-]+(?:[^a-z+.\-:]|$))/i // eslint-disable-line no-useless-escape
+);
+var IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = seal(/^(?:\w+script|data):/i);
+var ATTR_WHITESPACE = seal(/[\u0000-\u0020\u00A0\u1680\u180E\u2000-\u2029\u205f\u3000]/g // eslint-disable-line no-control-regex
+);
+
+var _typeof = typeof Symbol === "function" && typeof Symbol.iterator === "symbol" ? function (obj) { return typeof obj; } : function (obj) { return obj && typeof Symbol === "function" && obj.constructor === Symbol && obj !== Symbol.prototype ? "symbol" : typeof obj; };
+
+function _toConsumableArray(arr) { if (Array.isArray(arr)) { for (var i = 0, arr2 = Array(arr.length); i < arr.length; i++) { arr2[i] = arr[i]; } return arr2; } else { return Array.from(arr); } }
+
+var _ref = typeof Reflect !== 'undefined' && Reflect;
+var apply = _ref.apply;
+
+var arraySlice = Array.prototype.slice;
+var freeze = Object.freeze;
+
+var getGlobal = function getGlobal() {
+ return typeof window === 'undefined' ? null : window;
+};
+
+if (!apply) {
+ apply = function apply(fun, thisValue, args) {
+ return fun.apply(thisValue, args);
+ };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Creates a no-op policy for internal use only.
+ * Don't export this function outside this module!
+ * @param {?TrustedTypePolicyFactory} trustedTypes The policy factory.
+ * @param {Document} document The document object (to determine policy name suffix)
+ * @return {?TrustedTypePolicy} The policy created (or null, if Trusted Types
+ * are not supported).
+ */
+var _createTrustedTypesPolicy = function _createTrustedTypesPolicy(trustedTypes, document) {
+ if ((typeof trustedTypes === 'undefined' ? 'undefined' : _typeof(trustedTypes)) !== 'object' || typeof trustedTypes.createPolicy !== 'function') {
+ return null;
+ }
+
+ // Allow the callers to control the unique policy name
+ // by adding a data-tt-policy-suffix to the script element with the DOMPurify.
+ // Policy creation with duplicate names throws in Trusted Types.
+ var suffix = null;
+ var ATTR_NAME = 'data-tt-policy-suffix';
+ if (document.currentScript && document.currentScript.hasAttribute(ATTR_NAME)) {
+ suffix = document.currentScript.getAttribute(ATTR_NAME);
+ }
+
+ var policyName = 'dompurify' + (suffix ? '#' + suffix : '');
+
+ try {
+ return trustedTypes.createPolicy(policyName, {
+ createHTML: function createHTML(html$$1) {
+ return html$$1;
+ }
+ });
+ } catch (e) {
+ // Policy creation failed (most likely another DOMPurify script has
+ // already run). Skip creating the policy, as this will only cause errors
+ // if TT are enforced.
+ console.warn('TrustedTypes policy ' + policyName + ' could not be created.');
+ return null;
+ }
+};
+
+function createDOMPurify() {
+ var window = arguments.length > 0 && arguments[0] !== undefined ? arguments[0] : getGlobal();
+
+ var DOMPurify = function DOMPurify(root) {
+ return createDOMPurify(root);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * Version label, exposed for easier checks
+ * if DOMPurify is up to date or not
+ */
+ DOMPurify.version = '1.0.8';
+
+ /**
+ * Array of elements that DOMPurify removed during sanitation.
+ * Empty if nothing was removed.
+ */
+ DOMPurify.removed = [];
+
+ if (!window || !window.document || window.document.nodeType !== 9) {
+ // Not running in a browser, provide a factory function
+ // so that you can pass your own Window
+ DOMPurify.isSupported = false;
+
+ return DOMPurify;
+ }
+
+ var originalDocument = window.document;
+ var useDOMParser = false;
+ var removeTitle = false;
+
+ var document = window.document;
+ var DocumentFragment = window.DocumentFragment,
+ HTMLTemplateElement = window.HTMLTemplateElement,
+ Node = window.Node,
+ NodeFilter = window.NodeFilter,
+ _window$NamedNodeMap = window.NamedNodeMap,
+ NamedNodeMap = _window$NamedNodeMap === undefined ? window.NamedNodeMap || window.MozNamedAttrMap : _window$NamedNodeMap,
+ Text = window.Text,
+ Comment = window.Comment,
+ DOMParser = window.DOMParser,
+ TrustedTypes = window.TrustedTypes;
+
+ // As per issue #47, the web-components registry is inherited by a
+ // new document created via createHTMLDocument. As per the spec
+ // (http://w3c.github.io/webcomponents/spec/custom/#creating-and-passing-registries)
+ // a new empty registry is used when creating a template contents owner
+ // document, so we use that as our parent document to ensure nothing
+ // is inherited.
+
+ if (typeof HTMLTemplateElement === 'function') {
+ var template = document.createElement('template');
+ if (template.content && template.content.ownerDocument) {
+ document = template.content.ownerDocument;
+ }
+ }
+
+ var trustedTypesPolicy = _createTrustedTypesPolicy(TrustedTypes, originalDocument);
+ var emptyHTML = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML('') : '';
+
+ var _document = document,
+ implementation = _document.implementation,
+ createNodeIterator = _document.createNodeIterator,
+ getElementsByTagName = _document.getElementsByTagName,
+ createDocumentFragment = _document.createDocumentFragment;
+ var importNode = originalDocument.importNode;
+
+
+ var hooks = {};
+
+ /**
+ * Expose whether this browser supports running the full DOMPurify.
+ */
+ DOMPurify.isSupported = implementation && typeof implementation.createHTMLDocument !== 'undefined' && document.documentMode !== 9;
+
+ var MUSTACHE_EXPR$$1 = MUSTACHE_EXPR,
+ ERB_EXPR$$1 = ERB_EXPR,
+ DATA_ATTR$$1 = DATA_ATTR,
+ ARIA_ATTR$$1 = ARIA_ATTR,
+ IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$$1 = IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA,
+ ATTR_WHITESPACE$$1 = ATTR_WHITESPACE;
+ var IS_ALLOWED_URI$$1 = IS_ALLOWED_URI;
+ /**
+ * We consider the elements and attributes below to be safe. Ideally
+ * don't add any new ones but feel free to remove unwanted ones.
+ */
+
+ /* allowed element names */
+
+ var ALLOWED_TAGS = null;
+ var DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [].concat(_toConsumableArray(html), _toConsumableArray(svg), _toConsumableArray(svgFilters), _toConsumableArray(mathMl), _toConsumableArray(text)));
+
+ /* Allowed attribute names */
+ var ALLOWED_ATTR = null;
+ var DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR = addToSet({}, [].concat(_toConsumableArray(html$1), _toConsumableArray(svg$1), _toConsumableArray(mathMl$1), _toConsumableArray(xml)));
+
+ /* Explicitly forbidden tags (overrides ALLOWED_TAGS/ADD_TAGS) */
+ var FORBID_TAGS = null;
+
+ /* Explicitly forbidden attributes (overrides ALLOWED_ATTR/ADD_ATTR) */
+ var FORBID_ATTR = null;
+
+ /* Decide if ARIA attributes are okay */
+ var ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = true;
+
+ /* Decide if custom data attributes are okay */
+ var ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = true;
+
+ /* Decide if unknown protocols are okay */
+ var ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = false;
+
+ /* Output should be safe for jQuery's $() factory? */
+ var SAFE_FOR_JQUERY = false;
+
+ /* Output should be safe for common template engines.
+ * This means, DOMPurify removes data attributes, mustaches and ERB
+ */
+ var SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = false;
+
+ /* Decide if document with <html>... should be returned */
+ var WHOLE_DOCUMENT = false;
+
+ /* Track whether config is already set on this instance of DOMPurify. */
+ var SET_CONFIG = false;
+
+ /* Decide if all elements (e.g. style, script) must be children of
+ * document.body. By default, browsers might move them to document.head */
+ var FORCE_BODY = false;
+
+ /* Decide if a DOM `HTMLBodyElement` should be returned, instead of a html
+ * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported).
+ * If `WHOLE_DOCUMENT` is enabled a `HTMLHtmlElement` will be returned instead
+ */
+ var RETURN_DOM = false;
+
+ /* Decide if a DOM `DocumentFragment` should be returned, instead of a html
+ * string (or a TrustedHTML object if Trusted Types are supported) */
+ var RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = false;
+
+ /* If `RETURN_DOM` or `RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT` is enabled, decide if the returned DOM
+ * `Node` is imported into the current `Document`. If this flag is not enabled the
+ * `Node` will belong (its ownerDocument) to a fresh `HTMLDocument`, created by
+ * DOMPurify. */
+ var RETURN_DOM_IMPORT = false;
+
+ /* Output should be free from DOM clobbering attacks? */
+ var SANITIZE_DOM = true;
+
+ /* Keep element content when removing element? */
+ var KEEP_CONTENT = true;
+
+ /* If a `Node` is passed to sanitize(), then performs sanitization in-place instead
+ * of importing it into a new Document and returning a sanitized copy */
+ var IN_PLACE = false;
+
+ /* Allow usage of profiles like html, svg and mathMl */
+ var USE_PROFILES = {};
+
+ /* Tags to ignore content of when KEEP_CONTENT is true */
+ var FORBID_CONTENTS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'head', 'math', 'script', 'style', 'template', 'svg', 'video']);
+
+ /* Tags that are safe for data: URIs */
+ var DATA_URI_TAGS = addToSet({}, ['audio', 'video', 'img', 'source', 'image']);
+
+ /* Attributes safe for values like "javascript:" */
+ var URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES = addToSet({}, ['alt', 'class', 'for', 'id', 'label', 'name', 'pattern', 'placeholder', 'summary', 'title', 'value', 'style', 'xmlns']);
+
+ /* Keep a reference to config to pass to hooks */
+ var CONFIG = null;
+
+ /* Ideally, do not touch anything below this line */
+ /* ______________________________________________ */
+
+ var formElement = document.createElement('form');
+
+ /**
+ * _parseConfig
+ *
+ * @param {Object} cfg optional config literal
+ */
+ // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+ var _parseConfig = function _parseConfig(cfg) {
+ if (CONFIG && CONFIG === cfg) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* Shield configuration object from tampering */
+ if (!cfg || (typeof cfg === 'undefined' ? 'undefined' : _typeof(cfg)) !== 'object') {
+ cfg = {};
+ }
+ /* Set configuration parameters */
+ ALLOWED_TAGS = 'ALLOWED_TAGS' in cfg ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_TAGS) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS;
+ ALLOWED_ATTR = 'ALLOWED_ATTR' in cfg ? addToSet({}, cfg.ALLOWED_ATTR) : DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR;
+ FORBID_TAGS = 'FORBID_TAGS' in cfg ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_TAGS) : {};
+ FORBID_ATTR = 'FORBID_ATTR' in cfg ? addToSet({}, cfg.FORBID_ATTR) : {};
+ USE_PROFILES = 'USE_PROFILES' in cfg ? cfg.USE_PROFILES : false;
+ ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
+ ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = cfg.ALLOW_DATA_ATTR !== false; // Default true
+ ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS = cfg.ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS || false; // Default false
+ SAFE_FOR_JQUERY = cfg.SAFE_FOR_JQUERY || false; // Default false
+ SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES = cfg.SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES || false; // Default false
+ WHOLE_DOCUMENT = cfg.WHOLE_DOCUMENT || false; // Default false
+ RETURN_DOM = cfg.RETURN_DOM || false; // Default false
+ RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT || false; // Default false
+ RETURN_DOM_IMPORT = cfg.RETURN_DOM_IMPORT || false; // Default false
+ FORCE_BODY = cfg.FORCE_BODY || false; // Default false
+ SANITIZE_DOM = cfg.SANITIZE_DOM !== false; // Default true
+ KEEP_CONTENT = cfg.KEEP_CONTENT !== false; // Default true
+ IN_PLACE = cfg.IN_PLACE || false; // Default false
+
+ IS_ALLOWED_URI$$1 = cfg.ALLOWED_URI_REGEXP || IS_ALLOWED_URI$$1;
+
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+ ALLOW_DATA_ATTR = false;
+ }
+
+ if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
+ RETURN_DOM = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse profile info */
+ if (USE_PROFILES) {
+ ALLOWED_TAGS = addToSet({}, [].concat(_toConsumableArray(text)));
+ ALLOWED_ATTR = [];
+ if (USE_PROFILES.html === true) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, html);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, html$1);
+ }
+ if (USE_PROFILES.svg === true) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svg);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg$1);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
+ }
+ if (USE_PROFILES.svgFilters === true) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, svgFilters);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, svg$1);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
+ }
+ if (USE_PROFILES.mathMl === true) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, mathMl);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, mathMl$1);
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, xml);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Merge configuration parameters */
+ if (cfg.ADD_TAGS) {
+ if (ALLOWED_TAGS === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_TAGS) {
+ ALLOWED_TAGS = clone(ALLOWED_TAGS);
+ }
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, cfg.ADD_TAGS);
+ }
+ if (cfg.ADD_ATTR) {
+ if (ALLOWED_ATTR === DEFAULT_ALLOWED_ATTR) {
+ ALLOWED_ATTR = clone(ALLOWED_ATTR);
+ }
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_ATTR, cfg.ADD_ATTR);
+ }
+ if (cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR) {
+ addToSet(URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES, cfg.ADD_URI_SAFE_ATTR);
+ }
+
+ /* Add #text in case KEEP_CONTENT is set to true */
+ if (KEEP_CONTENT) {
+ ALLOWED_TAGS['#text'] = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Add html, head and body to ALLOWED_TAGS in case WHOLE_DOCUMENT is true */
+ if (WHOLE_DOCUMENT) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['html', 'head', 'body']);
+ }
+
+ /* Add tbody to ALLOWED_TAGS in case tables are permitted, see #286 */
+ if (ALLOWED_TAGS.table) {
+ addToSet(ALLOWED_TAGS, ['tbody']);
+ }
+
+ // Prevent further manipulation of configuration.
+ // Not available in IE8, Safari 5, etc.
+ if (freeze) {
+ freeze(cfg);
+ }
+
+ CONFIG = cfg;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _forceRemove
+ *
+ * @param {Node} node a DOM node
+ */
+ var _forceRemove = function _forceRemove(node) {
+ DOMPurify.removed.push({ element: node });
+ try {
+ node.parentNode.removeChild(node);
+ } catch (err) {
+ node.outerHTML = emptyHTML;
+ }
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _removeAttribute
+ *
+ * @param {String} name an Attribute name
+ * @param {Node} node a DOM node
+ */
+ var _removeAttribute = function _removeAttribute(name, node) {
+ try {
+ DOMPurify.removed.push({
+ attribute: node.getAttributeNode(name),
+ from: node
+ });
+ } catch (err) {
+ DOMPurify.removed.push({
+ attribute: null,
+ from: node
+ });
+ }
+ node.removeAttribute(name);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _initDocument
+ *
+ * @param {String} dirty a string of dirty markup
+ * @return {Document} a DOM, filled with the dirty markup
+ */
+ var _initDocument = function _initDocument(dirty) {
+ /* Create a HTML document */
+ var doc = void 0;
+ var leadingWhitespace = void 0;
+
+ if (FORCE_BODY) {
+ dirty = '<remove></remove>' + dirty;
+ } else {
+ /* If FORCE_BODY isn't used, leading whitespace needs to be preserved manually */
+ var matches = dirty.match(/^[\s]+/);
+ leadingWhitespace = matches && matches[0];
+ if (leadingWhitespace) {
+ dirty = dirty.slice(leadingWhitespace.length);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Use DOMParser to workaround Firefox bug (see comment below) */
+ if (useDOMParser) {
+ try {
+ doc = new DOMParser().parseFromString(dirty, 'text/html');
+ } catch (err) {}
+ }
+
+ /* Remove title to fix a mXSS bug in older MS Edge */
+ if (removeTitle) {
+ addToSet(FORBID_TAGS, ['title']);
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise use createHTMLDocument, because DOMParser is unsafe in
+ Safari (see comment below) */
+ if (!doc || !doc.documentElement) {
+ doc = implementation.createHTMLDocument('');
+ var _doc = doc,
+ body = _doc.body;
+
+ body.parentNode.removeChild(body.parentNode.firstElementChild);
+ body.outerHTML = trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+ }
+
+ if (leadingWhitespace) {
+ doc.body.insertBefore(document.createTextNode(leadingWhitespace), doc.body.childNodes[0] || null);
+ }
+
+ /* Work on whole document or just its body */
+ return getElementsByTagName.call(doc, WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? 'html' : 'body')[0];
+ };
+
+ // Firefox uses a different parser for innerHTML rather than
+ // DOMParser (see https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1205631)
+ // which means that you *must* use DOMParser, otherwise the output may
+ // not be safe if used in a document.write context later.
+ //
+ // So we feature detect the Firefox bug and use the DOMParser if necessary.
+ //
+ // MS Edge, in older versions, is affected by an mXSS behavior. The second
+ // check tests for the behavior and fixes it if necessary.
+ if (DOMPurify.isSupported) {
+ (function () {
+ try {
+ var doc = _initDocument('<svg><p><style><img src="</style><img src=x onerror=alert(1)//">');
+ if (doc.querySelector('svg img')) {
+ useDOMParser = true;
+ }
+ } catch (err) {}
+ })();
+ (function () {
+ try {
+ var doc = _initDocument('<x/><title>&lt;/title&gt;&lt;img&gt;');
+ if (doc.querySelector('title').innerHTML.match(/<\/title/)) {
+ removeTitle = true;
+ }
+ } catch (err) {}
+ })();
+ }
+
+ /**
+ * _createIterator
+ *
+ * @param {Document} root document/fragment to create iterator for
+ * @return {Iterator} iterator instance
+ */
+ var _createIterator = function _createIterator(root) {
+ return createNodeIterator.call(root.ownerDocument || root, root, NodeFilter.SHOW_ELEMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_COMMENT | NodeFilter.SHOW_TEXT, function () {
+ return NodeFilter.FILTER_ACCEPT;
+ }, false);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _isClobbered
+ *
+ * @param {Node} elm element to check for clobbering attacks
+ * @return {Boolean} true if clobbered, false if safe
+ */
+ var _isClobbered = function _isClobbered(elm) {
+ if (elm instanceof Text || elm instanceof Comment) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (typeof elm.nodeName !== 'string' || typeof elm.textContent !== 'string' || typeof elm.removeChild !== 'function' || !(elm.attributes instanceof NamedNodeMap) || typeof elm.removeAttribute !== 'function' || typeof elm.setAttribute !== 'function') {
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _isNode
+ *
+ * @param {Node} obj object to check whether it's a DOM node
+ * @return {Boolean} true is object is a DOM node
+ */
+ var _isNode = function _isNode(obj) {
+ return (typeof Node === 'undefined' ? 'undefined' : _typeof(Node)) === 'object' ? obj instanceof Node : obj && (typeof obj === 'undefined' ? 'undefined' : _typeof(obj)) === 'object' && typeof obj.nodeType === 'number' && typeof obj.nodeName === 'string';
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _executeHook
+ * Execute user configurable hooks
+ *
+ * @param {String} entryPoint Name of the hook's entry point
+ * @param {Node} currentNode node to work on with the hook
+ * @param {Object} data additional hook parameters
+ */
+ var _executeHook = function _executeHook(entryPoint, currentNode, data) {
+ if (!hooks[entryPoint]) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ hooks[entryPoint].forEach(function (hook) {
+ hook.call(DOMPurify, currentNode, data, CONFIG);
+ });
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _sanitizeElements
+ *
+ * @protect nodeName
+ * @protect textContent
+ * @protect removeChild
+ *
+ * @param {Node} currentNode to check for permission to exist
+ * @return {Boolean} true if node was killed, false if left alive
+ */
+ var _sanitizeElements = function _sanitizeElements(currentNode) {
+ var content = void 0;
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('beforeSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);
+
+ /* Check if element is clobbered or can clobber */
+ if (_isClobbered(currentNode)) {
+ _forceRemove(currentNode);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /* Now let's check the element's type and name */
+ var tagName = currentNode.nodeName.toLowerCase();
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('uponSanitizeElement', currentNode, {
+ tagName: tagName,
+ allowedTags: ALLOWED_TAGS
+ });
+
+ /* Remove element if anything forbids its presence */
+ if (!ALLOWED_TAGS[tagName] || FORBID_TAGS[tagName]) {
+ /* Keep content except for black-listed elements */
+ if (KEEP_CONTENT && !FORBID_CONTENTS[tagName] && typeof currentNode.insertAdjacentHTML === 'function') {
+ try {
+ var htmlToInsert = currentNode.innerHTML;
+ currentNode.insertAdjacentHTML('AfterEnd', trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(htmlToInsert) : htmlToInsert);
+ } catch (err) {}
+ }
+ _forceRemove(currentNode);
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ /* Convert markup to cover jQuery behavior */
+ if (SAFE_FOR_JQUERY && !currentNode.firstElementChild && (!currentNode.content || !currentNode.content.firstElementChild) && /</g.test(currentNode.textContent)) {
+ DOMPurify.removed.push({ element: currentNode.cloneNode() });
+ if (currentNode.innerHTML) {
+ currentNode.innerHTML = currentNode.innerHTML.replace(/</g, '&lt;');
+ } else {
+ currentNode.innerHTML = currentNode.textContent.replace(/</g, '&lt;');
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Sanitize element content to be template-safe */
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES && currentNode.nodeType === 3) {
+ /* Get the element's text content */
+ content = currentNode.textContent;
+ content = content.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR$$1, ' ');
+ content = content.replace(ERB_EXPR$$1, ' ');
+ if (currentNode.textContent !== content) {
+ DOMPurify.removed.push({ element: currentNode.cloneNode() });
+ currentNode.textContent = content;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('afterSanitizeElements', currentNode, null);
+
+ return false;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _isValidAttribute
+ *
+ * @param {string} lcTag Lowercase tag name of containing element.
+ * @param {string} lcName Lowercase attribute name.
+ * @param {string} value Attribute value.
+ * @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid, otherwise false.
+ */
+ var _isValidAttribute = function _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value) {
+ /* Make sure attribute cannot clobber */
+ if (SANITIZE_DOM && (lcName === 'id' || lcName === 'name') && (value in document || value in formElement)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanitize attribute content to be template-safe */
+ if (SAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES) {
+ value = value.replace(MUSTACHE_EXPR$$1, ' ');
+ value = value.replace(ERB_EXPR$$1, ' ');
+ }
+
+ /* Allow valid data-* attributes: At least one character after "-"
+ (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/dom.html#embedding-custom-non-visible-data-with-the-data-*-attributes)
+ XML-compatible (https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/infrastructure.html#xml-compatible and http://www.w3.org/TR/xml/#d0e804)
+ We don't need to check the value; it's always URI safe. */
+ if (ALLOW_DATA_ATTR && DATA_ATTR$$1.test(lcName)) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ } else if (ALLOW_ARIA_ATTR && ARIA_ATTR$$1.test(lcName)) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ /* Otherwise, check the name is permitted */
+ } else if (!ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || FORBID_ATTR[lcName]) {
+ return false;
+
+ /* Check value is safe. First, is attr inert? If so, is safe */
+ } else if (URI_SAFE_ATTRIBUTES[lcName]) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ /* Check no script, data or unknown possibly unsafe URI
+ unless we know URI values are safe for that attribute */
+ } else if (IS_ALLOWED_URI$$1.test(value.replace(ATTR_WHITESPACE$$1, ''))) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ /* Keep image data URIs alive if src/xlink:href is allowed */
+ /* Further prevent gadget XSS for dynamically built script tags */
+ } else if ((lcName === 'src' || lcName === 'xlink:href') && lcTag !== 'script' && value.indexOf('data:') === 0 && DATA_URI_TAGS[lcTag]) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ /* Allow unknown protocols: This provides support for links that
+ are handled by protocol handlers which may be unknown ahead of
+ time, e.g. fb:, spotify: */
+ } else if (ALLOW_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOLS && !IS_SCRIPT_OR_DATA$$1.test(value.replace(ATTR_WHITESPACE$$1, ''))) {
+ // This attribute is safe
+ /* Check for binary attributes */
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-negated-condition
+ } else if (!value) {
+ // Binary attributes are safe at this point
+ /* Anything else, presume unsafe, do not add it back */
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _sanitizeAttributes
+ *
+ * @protect attributes
+ * @protect nodeName
+ * @protect removeAttribute
+ * @protect setAttribute
+ *
+ * @param {Node} node to sanitize
+ */
+ // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+ var _sanitizeAttributes = function _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode) {
+ var attr = void 0;
+ var value = void 0;
+ var lcName = void 0;
+ var idAttr = void 0;
+ var l = void 0;
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('beforeSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);
+
+ var attributes = currentNode.attributes;
+
+ /* Check if we have attributes; if not we might have a text node */
+
+ if (!attributes) {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ var hookEvent = {
+ attrName: '',
+ attrValue: '',
+ keepAttr: true,
+ allowedAttributes: ALLOWED_ATTR
+ };
+ l = attributes.length;
+
+ /* Go backwards over all attributes; safely remove bad ones */
+ while (l--) {
+ attr = attributes[l];
+ var _attr = attr,
+ name = _attr.name,
+ namespaceURI = _attr.namespaceURI;
+
+ value = attr.value.trim();
+ lcName = name.toLowerCase();
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ hookEvent.attrName = lcName;
+ hookEvent.attrValue = value;
+ hookEvent.keepAttr = true;
+ _executeHook('uponSanitizeAttribute', currentNode, hookEvent);
+ value = hookEvent.attrValue;
+
+ /* Remove attribute */
+ // Safari (iOS + Mac), last tested v8.0.5, crashes if you try to
+ // remove a "name" attribute from an <img> tag that has an "id"
+ // attribute at the time.
+ if (lcName === 'name' && currentNode.nodeName === 'IMG' && attributes.id) {
+ idAttr = attributes.id;
+ attributes = apply(arraySlice, attributes, []);
+ _removeAttribute('id', currentNode);
+ _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+ if (attributes.indexOf(idAttr) > l) {
+ currentNode.setAttribute('id', idAttr.value);
+ }
+ } else if (
+ // This works around a bug in Safari, where input[type=file]
+ // cannot be dynamically set after type has been removed
+ currentNode.nodeName === 'INPUT' && lcName === 'type' && value === 'file' && (ALLOWED_ATTR[lcName] || !FORBID_ATTR[lcName])) {
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ // This avoids a crash in Safari v9.0 with double-ids.
+ // The trick is to first set the id to be empty and then to
+ // remove the attribute
+ if (name === 'id') {
+ currentNode.setAttribute(name, '');
+ }
+ _removeAttribute(name, currentNode);
+ }
+
+ /* Did the hooks approve of the attribute? */
+ if (!hookEvent.keepAttr) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Is `value` valid for this attribute? */
+ var lcTag = currentNode.nodeName.toLowerCase();
+ if (!_isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle invalid data-* attribute set by try-catching it */
+ try {
+ if (namespaceURI) {
+ currentNode.setAttributeNS(namespaceURI, name, value);
+ } else {
+ /* Fallback to setAttribute() for browser-unrecognized namespaces e.g. "x-schema". */
+ currentNode.setAttribute(name, value);
+ }
+ DOMPurify.removed.pop();
+ } catch (err) {}
+ }
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('afterSanitizeAttributes', currentNode, null);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * _sanitizeShadowDOM
+ *
+ * @param {DocumentFragment} fragment to iterate over recursively
+ */
+ var _sanitizeShadowDOM = function _sanitizeShadowDOM(fragment) {
+ var shadowNode = void 0;
+ var shadowIterator = _createIterator(fragment);
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('beforeSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);
+
+ while (shadowNode = shadowIterator.nextNode()) {
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('uponSanitizeShadowNode', shadowNode, null);
+
+ /* Sanitize tags and elements */
+ if (_sanitizeElements(shadowNode)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Deep shadow DOM detected */
+ if (shadowNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM(shadowNode.content);
+ }
+
+ /* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */
+ _sanitizeAttributes(shadowNode);
+ }
+
+ /* Execute a hook if present */
+ _executeHook('afterSanitizeShadowDOM', fragment, null);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * Sanitize
+ * Public method providing core sanitation functionality
+ *
+ * @param {String|Node} dirty string or DOM node
+ * @param {Object} configuration object
+ */
+ // eslint-disable-next-line complexity
+ DOMPurify.sanitize = function (dirty, cfg) {
+ var body = void 0;
+ var importedNode = void 0;
+ var currentNode = void 0;
+ var oldNode = void 0;
+ var returnNode = void 0;
+ /* Make sure we have a string to sanitize.
+ DO NOT return early, as this will return the wrong type if
+ the user has requested a DOM object rather than a string */
+ if (!dirty) {
+ dirty = '<!-->';
+ }
+
+ /* Stringify, in case dirty is an object */
+ if (typeof dirty !== 'string' && !_isNode(dirty)) {
+ // eslint-disable-next-line no-negated-condition
+ if (typeof dirty.toString !== 'function') {
+ throw new TypeError('toString is not a function');
+ } else {
+ dirty = dirty.toString();
+ if (typeof dirty !== 'string') {
+ throw new TypeError('dirty is not a string, aborting');
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Check we can run. Otherwise fall back or ignore */
+ if (!DOMPurify.isSupported) {
+ if (_typeof(window.toStaticHTML) === 'object' || typeof window.toStaticHTML === 'function') {
+ if (typeof dirty === 'string') {
+ return window.toStaticHTML(dirty);
+ }
+ if (_isNode(dirty)) {
+ return window.toStaticHTML(dirty.outerHTML);
+ }
+ }
+ return dirty;
+ }
+
+ /* Assign config vars */
+ if (!SET_CONFIG) {
+ _parseConfig(cfg);
+ }
+
+ /* Clean up removed elements */
+ DOMPurify.removed = [];
+
+ if (IN_PLACE) {
+ /* No special handling necessary for in-place sanitization */
+ } else if (dirty instanceof Node) {
+ /* If dirty is a DOM element, append to an empty document to avoid
+ elements being stripped by the parser */
+ body = _initDocument('<!-->');
+ importedNode = body.ownerDocument.importNode(dirty, true);
+ if (importedNode.nodeType === 1 && importedNode.nodeName === 'BODY') {
+ /* Node is already a body, use as is */
+ body = importedNode;
+ } else {
+ body.appendChild(importedNode);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Exit directly if we have nothing to do */
+ if (!RETURN_DOM && !WHOLE_DOCUMENT && dirty.indexOf('<') === -1) {
+ return trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(dirty) : dirty;
+ }
+
+ /* Initialize the document to work on */
+ body = _initDocument(dirty);
+
+ /* Check we have a DOM node from the data */
+ if (!body) {
+ return RETURN_DOM ? null : emptyHTML;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Remove first element node (ours) if FORCE_BODY is set */
+ if (body && FORCE_BODY) {
+ _forceRemove(body.firstChild);
+ }
+
+ /* Get node iterator */
+ var nodeIterator = _createIterator(IN_PLACE ? dirty : body);
+
+ /* Now start iterating over the created document */
+ while (currentNode = nodeIterator.nextNode()) {
+ /* Fix IE's strange behavior with manipulated textNodes #89 */
+ if (currentNode.nodeType === 3 && currentNode === oldNode) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Sanitize tags and elements */
+ if (_sanitizeElements(currentNode)) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Shadow DOM detected, sanitize it */
+ if (currentNode.content instanceof DocumentFragment) {
+ _sanitizeShadowDOM(currentNode.content);
+ }
+
+ /* Check attributes, sanitize if necessary */
+ _sanitizeAttributes(currentNode);
+
+ oldNode = currentNode;
+ }
+
+ oldNode = null;
+
+ /* If we sanitized `dirty` in-place, return it. */
+ if (IN_PLACE) {
+ return dirty;
+ }
+
+ /* Return sanitized string or DOM */
+ if (RETURN_DOM) {
+ if (RETURN_DOM_FRAGMENT) {
+ returnNode = createDocumentFragment.call(body.ownerDocument);
+
+ while (body.firstChild) {
+ returnNode.appendChild(body.firstChild);
+ }
+ } else {
+ returnNode = body;
+ }
+
+ if (RETURN_DOM_IMPORT) {
+ /* AdoptNode() is not used because internal state is not reset
+ (e.g. the past names map of a HTMLFormElement), this is safe
+ in theory but we would rather not risk another attack vector.
+ The state that is cloned by importNode() is explicitly defined
+ by the specs. */
+ returnNode = importNode.call(originalDocument, returnNode, true);
+ }
+
+ return returnNode;
+ }
+
+ var serializedHTML = WHOLE_DOCUMENT ? body.outerHTML : body.innerHTML;
+ return trustedTypesPolicy ? trustedTypesPolicy.createHTML(serializedHTML) : serializedHTML;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * Public method to set the configuration once
+ * setConfig
+ *
+ * @param {Object} cfg configuration object
+ */
+ DOMPurify.setConfig = function (cfg) {
+ _parseConfig(cfg);
+ SET_CONFIG = true;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * Public method to remove the configuration
+ * clearConfig
+ *
+ */
+ DOMPurify.clearConfig = function () {
+ CONFIG = null;
+ SET_CONFIG = false;
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * Public method to check if an attribute value is valid.
+ * Uses last set config, if any. Otherwise, uses config defaults.
+ * isValidAttribute
+ *
+ * @param {string} tag Tag name of containing element.
+ * @param {string} attr Attribute name.
+ * @param {string} value Attribute value.
+ * @return {Boolean} Returns true if `value` is valid. Otherwise, returns false.
+ */
+ DOMPurify.isValidAttribute = function (tag, attr, value) {
+ /* Initialize shared config vars if necessary. */
+ if (!CONFIG) {
+ _parseConfig({});
+ }
+ var lcTag = tag.toLowerCase();
+ var lcName = attr.toLowerCase();
+ return _isValidAttribute(lcTag, lcName, value);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * AddHook
+ * Public method to add DOMPurify hooks
+ *
+ * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to add
+ * @param {Function} hookFunction function to execute
+ */
+ DOMPurify.addHook = function (entryPoint, hookFunction) {
+ if (typeof hookFunction !== 'function') {
+ return;
+ }
+ hooks[entryPoint] = hooks[entryPoint] || [];
+ hooks[entryPoint].push(hookFunction);
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * RemoveHook
+ * Public method to remove a DOMPurify hook at a given entryPoint
+ * (pops it from the stack of hooks if more are present)
+ *
+ * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hook to remove
+ */
+ DOMPurify.removeHook = function (entryPoint) {
+ if (hooks[entryPoint]) {
+ hooks[entryPoint].pop();
+ }
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * RemoveHooks
+ * Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks at a given entryPoint
+ *
+ * @param {String} entryPoint entry point for the hooks to remove
+ */
+ DOMPurify.removeHooks = function (entryPoint) {
+ if (hooks[entryPoint]) {
+ hooks[entryPoint] = [];
+ }
+ };
+
+ /**
+ * RemoveAllHooks
+ * Public method to remove all DOMPurify hooks
+ *
+ */
+ DOMPurify.removeAllHooks = function () {
+ hooks = {};
+ };
+
+ return DOMPurify;
+}
+
+var purify = createDOMPurify();
+
+return purify;
+
+})));
+//# sourceMappingURL=purify.js.map \ No newline at end of file