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Diffstat (limited to 'SoftHSMv2/src/lib/test/DeriveTests.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | SoftHSMv2/src/lib/test/DeriveTests.cpp | 737 |
1 files changed, 737 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/SoftHSMv2/src/lib/test/DeriveTests.cpp b/SoftHSMv2/src/lib/test/DeriveTests.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000..588d0b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/SoftHSMv2/src/lib/test/DeriveTests.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,737 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 SURFnet + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED + * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY + * DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE + * GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS + * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER + * IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR + * OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN + * IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +/***************************************************************************** + DeriveTests.cpp + + Contains test cases for: + C_DeriveKey + + *****************************************************************************/ + +#include <config.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include "DeriveTests.h" + +// CKA_TOKEN +const CK_BBOOL ON_TOKEN = CK_TRUE; +const CK_BBOOL IN_SESSION = CK_FALSE; + +// CKA_PRIVATE +const CK_BBOOL IS_PRIVATE = CK_TRUE; +const CK_BBOOL IS_PUBLIC = CK_FALSE; + + +CPPUNIT_TEST_SUITE_REGISTRATION(DeriveTests); + +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateDhKeyPair(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bTokenPuk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePuk, CK_BBOOL bTokenPrk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePrk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPuk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPrk) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_BYTE bn1024[] = { + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, + 0xc9, 0x0f, 0xda, 0xa2, 0x21, 0x68, 0xc2, 0x34, + 0xc4, 0xc6, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x80, 0xdc, 0x1c, 0xd1, + 0x29, 0x02, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x8a, 0x67, 0xcc, 0x74, + 0x02, 0x0b, 0xbe, 0xa6, 0x3b, 0x13, 0x9b, 0x22, + 0x51, 0x4a, 0x08, 0x79, 0x8e, 0x34, 0x04, 0xdd, + 0xef, 0x95, 0x19, 0xb3, 0xcd, 0x3a, 0x43, 0x1b, + 0x30, 0x2b, 0x0a, 0x6d, 0xf2, 0x5f, 0x14, 0x37, + 0x4f, 0xe1, 0x35, 0x6d, 0x6d, 0x51, 0xc2, 0x45, + 0xe4, 0x85, 0xb5, 0x76, 0x62, 0x5e, 0x7e, 0xc6, + 0xf4, 0x4c, 0x42, 0xe9, 0xa6, 0x37, 0xed, 0x6b, + 0x0b, 0xff, 0x5c, 0xb6, 0xf4, 0x06, 0xb7, 0xed, + 0xee, 0x38, 0x6b, 0xfb, 0x5a, 0x89, 0x9f, 0xa5, + 0xae, 0x9f, 0x24, 0x11, 0x7c, 0x4b, 0x1f, 0xe6, + 0x49, 0x28, 0x66, 0x51, 0xec, 0xe6, 0x53, 0x81, + 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff + }; + CK_BYTE bn2[] = { 2 }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pukAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bTokenPuk, sizeof(bTokenPuk) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivatePuk, sizeof(bPrivatePuk) }, + { CKA_PRIME, &bn1024, sizeof(bn1024) }, + { CKA_BASE, &bn2, sizeof(bn2) } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE prkAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bTokenPrk, sizeof(bTokenPrk) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivatePrk, sizeof(bPrivatePrk) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) } + }; + + hPuk = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + hPrk = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &mechanism, + pukAttribs, sizeof(pukAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + prkAttribs, sizeof(prkAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hPuk, &hPrk) ); +} + +#ifdef WITH_ECC +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateEcKeyPair(const char* curve, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bTokenPuk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePuk, CK_BBOOL bTokenPrk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePrk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPuk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPrk) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_EC; + CK_BYTE oidP256[] = { 0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0xCE, 0x3D, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07 }; + CK_BYTE oidP384[] = { 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22 }; + CK_BYTE oidP521[] = { 0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x23 }; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE pukAttribs[] = { + { CKA_EC_PARAMS, NULL, 0 }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) }, + { CKA_TOKEN, &bTokenPuk, sizeof(bTokenPuk) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivatePuk, sizeof(bPrivatePuk) } + }; + CK_ATTRIBUTE prkAttribs[] = { + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) }, + { CKA_TOKEN, &bTokenPrk, sizeof(bTokenPrk) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivatePrk, sizeof(bPrivatePrk) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) } + }; + + /* Select the curve */ + if (strcmp(curve, "P-256") == 0) + { + pukAttribs[0].pValue = oidP256; + pukAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(oidP256); + } + else if (strcmp(curve, "P-384") == 0) + { + pukAttribs[0].pValue = oidP384; + pukAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(oidP384); + } + else if (strcmp(curve, "P-521") == 0) + { + pukAttribs[0].pValue = oidP521; + pukAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(oidP521); + } + else + { + return CKR_GENERAL_ERROR; + } + + hPuk = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + hPrk = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKeyPair(hSession, &mechanism, + pukAttribs, sizeof(pukAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + prkAttribs, sizeof(prkAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hPuk, &hPrk) ); +} +#endif + +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateAesKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bToken, CK_BBOOL bPrivate, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_ULONG bytes = 16; + // CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bToken, sizeof(bToken) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivate, sizeof(bPrivate) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &bytes, sizeof(bytes) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); +} + +#ifndef WITH_FIPS +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateDesKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bToken, CK_BBOOL bPrivate, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_DES_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + // CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bToken, sizeof(bToken) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivate, sizeof(bPrivate) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); +} +#endif + +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateDes2Key(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bToken, CK_BBOOL bPrivate, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + // CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bToken, sizeof(bToken) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivate, sizeof(bPrivate) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); +} + +CK_RV DeriveTests::generateDes3Key(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bToken, CK_BBOOL bPrivate, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey) +{ + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + // CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_TOKEN, &bToken, sizeof(bToken) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bPrivate, sizeof(bPrivate) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DERIVE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + return CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GenerateKey(hSession, &mechanism, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); +} + +void DeriveTests::dhDerive(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey) +{ + CK_ATTRIBUTE valAttrib = { CKA_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_RV rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, &valAttrib, 1) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + valAttrib.pValue = (CK_BYTE_PTR)malloc(valAttrib.ulValueLen); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, &valAttrib, 1) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + mechanism.pParameter = valAttrib.pValue; + mechanism.ulParameterLen = valAttrib.ulValueLen; + CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ULONG secLen = 32; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &secLen, sizeof(secLen) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_DeriveKey(hSession, &mechanism, hPrivateKey, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); + free(valAttrib.pValue); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); +} + +#ifdef WITH_ECC +void DeriveTests::ecdhDerive(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey, bool useRaw) +{ + CK_ATTRIBUTE valAttrib = { CKA_EC_POINT, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_RV rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, &valAttrib, 1) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + valAttrib.pValue = (CK_BYTE_PTR)malloc(valAttrib.ulValueLen); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hPublicKey, &valAttrib, 1) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS parms = { CKD_NULL, 0, NULL_PTR, 0, NULL_PTR }; + // Use RAW or DER format + if (useRaw) + { + size_t offset = 0; + unsigned char* buf = (unsigned char*)valAttrib.pValue; + if (valAttrib.ulValueLen > 2 && buf[0] == 0x04) + { + if (buf[1] < 0x80) + { + offset = 2; + } + else + { + if (valAttrib.ulValueLen > ((buf[1] & 0x7F) + (unsigned int)2)) + { + offset = 2 + (buf[1] & 0x7F); + } + } + } + parms.pPublicData = buf + offset; + parms.ulPublicDataLen = valAttrib.ulValueLen - offset; + } + else + { + parms.pPublicData = (unsigned char*)valAttrib.pValue; + parms.ulPublicDataLen = valAttrib.ulValueLen; + } + + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, NULL, 0 }; + mechanism.pParameter = &parms; + mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(parms); + CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_KEY_TYPE keyType = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET; + CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ULONG secLen = 32; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &secLen, sizeof(secLen) } + }; + + hKey = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_DeriveKey(hSession, &mechanism, hPrivateKey, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hKey) ); + free(valAttrib.pValue); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); +} +#endif + +bool DeriveTests::compareSecret(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey1, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey2) +{ + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0 }, + { CKA_CHECK_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0 } + }; + CK_BYTE val1[128]; + CK_BYTE check1[3]; + keyAttribs[0].pValue = val1; + keyAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(val1); + keyAttribs[1].pValue = check1; + keyAttribs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(check1); + CK_RV rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hKey1, keyAttribs, 2) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(keyAttribs[0].ulValueLen == 32); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(keyAttribs[1].ulValueLen == 3); + CK_BYTE val2[128]; + CK_BYTE check2[3]; + keyAttribs[0].pValue = val2; + keyAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(val2); + keyAttribs[1].pValue = check2; + keyAttribs[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(check2); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hKey2, keyAttribs, 2) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(keyAttribs[0].ulValueLen == 32); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(keyAttribs[1].ulValueLen == 3); + return memcmp(val1, val2, 32) == 0 && + memcmp(check1, check2, 3) == 0; +} + +void DeriveTests::testDhDerive() +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRO; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRW; + + // Just make sure that we finalize any previous tests + CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Finalize(NULL_PTR) ); + + // Open read-only session on when the token is not initialized should fail + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); + + // Initialize the library and start the test. + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Initialize(NULL_PTR) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-only session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-write session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION | CKF_RW_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRW) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Login USER into the sessions so we can create a private objects + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Login(hSessionRO,CKU_USER,m_userPin1,m_userPin1Length) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Public Session keys + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPuk1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrk1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPuk2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrk2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1); + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Private Session Keys + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Public Token Keys + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Private Token Keys + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateDhKeyPair(hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1); + dhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); +} + +#ifdef WITH_ECC +void DeriveTests::testEcdhDerive() +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRO; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRW; + + // Just make sure that we finalize any previous tests + CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Finalize(NULL_PTR) ); + + // Open read-only session on when the token is not initialized should fail + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); + + // Initialize the library and start the test. + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Initialize(NULL_PTR) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-only session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-write session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION | CKF_RW_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRW) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Login USER into the sessions so we can create a private objects + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Login(hSessionRO,CKU_USER,m_userPin1,m_userPin1Length) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Public Session keys + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPuk1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrk1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPuk2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrk2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-256",hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-256",hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey1 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1,true); + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2,false); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Private Session Keys + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-384",hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-384",hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,IN_SESSION,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1,true); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2,false); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Public Token Keys + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-521",hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-521",hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,ON_TOKEN,IS_PUBLIC,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1,true); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2,false); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); + + // Private Token Keys + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-256",hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk1,hPrk1); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateEcKeyPair("P-256",hSessionRW,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,ON_TOKEN,IS_PRIVATE,hPuk2,hPrk2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk1,hPrk2,hKey1,true); + ecdhDerive(hSessionRW,hPuk2,hPrk1,hKey2,false); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(compareSecret(hSessionRW,hKey1,hKey2)); +} +#endif + +void DeriveTests::symDerive(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hDerive, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechType, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType) +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { mechType, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_MECHANISM mechEncrypt = { CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED, NULL_PTR, 0 }; + CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA param1; + CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS param2; + CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS param3; + + CK_BYTE data[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x09, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, + 0x17, 0x18, 0x19, 0x20, 0x21, 0x22, 0x23, 0x24, + 0x25, 0x26, 0x27, 0x28, 0x29, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32 + }; + CK_ULONG secLen = 0; + + switch (mechType) + { + case CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA: + case CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA: + case CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA: + param1.pData = &data[0]; + param1.ulLen = sizeof(data); + mechanism.pParameter = ¶m1; + mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param1); + break; + case CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: + case CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: + memcpy(param2.iv, "12345678", 8); + param2.pData = &data[0]; + param2.length = sizeof(data); + mechanism.pParameter = ¶m2; + mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param2); + break; + case CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA: + memcpy(param3.iv, "1234567890ABCDEF", 16); + param3.pData = &data[0]; + param3.length = sizeof(data); + mechanism.pParameter = ¶m3; + mechanism.ulParameterLen = sizeof(param3); + break; + default: + CPPUNIT_FAIL("Invalid mechanism"); + } + + switch (keyType) + { + case CKK_GENERIC_SECRET: + secLen = 32; + break; + case CKK_DES: + mechEncrypt.mechanism = CKM_DES_ECB; + break; + case CKK_DES2: + case CKK_DES3: + mechEncrypt.mechanism = CKM_DES3_ECB; + break; + case CKK_AES: + mechEncrypt.mechanism = CKM_AES_ECB; + secLen = 32; + break; + default: + CPPUNIT_FAIL("Invalid key type"); + } + + CK_OBJECT_CLASS keyClass = CKO_SECRET_KEY; + CK_BBOOL bFalse = CK_FALSE; + CK_BBOOL bTrue = CK_TRUE; + CK_ATTRIBUTE keyAttribs[] = { + { CKA_CLASS, &keyClass, sizeof(keyClass) }, + { CKA_KEY_TYPE, &keyType, sizeof(keyType) }, + { CKA_PRIVATE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_ENCRYPT, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_DECRYPT, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_SENSITIVE, &bFalse, sizeof(bFalse) }, + { CKA_EXTRACTABLE, &bTrue, sizeof(bTrue) }, + { CKA_VALUE_LEN, &secLen, sizeof(secLen) } + }; + + hDerive = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + if (secLen > 0) + { + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_DeriveKey(hSession, &mechanism, hKey, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE), + &hDerive) ); + } + else + { + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_DeriveKey(hSession, &mechanism, hKey, + keyAttribs, sizeof(keyAttribs)/sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE) - 1, + &hDerive) ); + } + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Check that KCV has been set + CK_ATTRIBUTE checkAttribs[] = { + { CKA_CHECK_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0 } + }; + CK_BYTE check[3]; + checkAttribs[0].pValue = check; + checkAttribs[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(check); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_GetAttributeValue(hSession, hDerive, checkAttribs, 1) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(checkAttribs[0].ulValueLen == 3); + + if (keyType == CKK_GENERIC_SECRET) return; + + CK_BYTE cipherText[300]; + CK_ULONG ulCipherTextLen; + CK_BYTE recoveredText[300]; + CK_ULONG ulRecoveredTextLen; + + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_EncryptInit(hSession,&mechEncrypt,hDerive) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK); + + ulCipherTextLen = sizeof(cipherText); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Encrypt(hSession,data,sizeof(data),cipherText,&ulCipherTextLen) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK); + + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_DecryptInit(hSession,&mechEncrypt,hDerive) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK); + + ulRecoveredTextLen = sizeof(recoveredText); + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Decrypt(hSession,cipherText,ulCipherTextLen,recoveredText,&ulRecoveredTextLen) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(ulRecoveredTextLen==sizeof(data)); + + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(memcmp(data, recoveredText, sizeof(data)) == 0); +} + +void DeriveTests::testSymDerive() +{ + CK_RV rv; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRO; + CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSessionRW; + + // Just make sure that we finalize any previous tests + CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Finalize(NULL_PTR) ); + + // Open read-only session on when the token is not initialized should fail + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED); + + // Initialize the library and start the test. + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Initialize(NULL_PTR) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-only session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRO) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Open read-write session + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_OpenSession(m_initializedTokenSlotID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION | CKF_RW_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &hSessionRW) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Login USER into the sessions so we can create private objects + rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Login(hSessionRO,CKU_USER,m_userPin1,m_userPin1Length) ); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Generate base key +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKeyDes = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#endif + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKeyDes2 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKeyDes3 = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKeyAes = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + rv = generateDesKey(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hKeyDes); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); +#endif + rv = generateDes2Key(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hKeyDes2); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateDes3Key(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hKeyDes3); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + rv = generateAesKey(hSessionRW,IN_SESSION,IS_PUBLIC,hKeyAes); + CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv == CKR_OK); + + // Derive keys + CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hDerive = CK_INVALID_HANDLE; +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes,hDerive,CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes2,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyDes3,hDerive,CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_GENERIC_SECRET); +#ifndef WITH_FIPS + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES); +#endif + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES2); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_DES3); + symDerive(hSessionRW,hKeyAes,hDerive,CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA,CKK_AES); +} + |