From 1faf201e8608dfa4d7af3460fd3d1fc7ebec398b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: talasila Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2017 11:47:55 -0500 Subject: Initial OpenECOMP Portal SDK commit Change-Id: I66a3491600a4b9ea241128dc29267eed6a78ed76 Signed-off-by: talasila --- .../external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js | 717 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 717 insertions(+) create mode 100644 ecomp-sdk/sdk-app/src/main/webapp/app/fusion/external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js (limited to 'ecomp-sdk/sdk-app/src/main/webapp/app/fusion/external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js') diff --git a/ecomp-sdk/sdk-app/src/main/webapp/app/fusion/external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js b/ecomp-sdk/sdk-app/src/main/webapp/app/fusion/external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js new file mode 100644 index 00000000..8b610c76 --- /dev/null +++ b/ecomp-sdk/sdk-app/src/main/webapp/app/fusion/external/angular-1.5/angular-sanitize.js @@ -0,0 +1,717 @@ +/** + * @license AngularJS v1.5.0 + * (c) 2010-2016 Google, Inc. http://angularjs.org + * License: MIT + */ +(function(window, angular, undefined) {'use strict'; + +/* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * + * Any commits to this file should be reviewed with security in mind. * + * Changes to this file can potentially create security vulnerabilities. * + * An approval from 2 Core members with history of modifying * + * this file is required. * + * * + * Does the change somehow allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed? * + * Or allows for someone to change the prototype of built-in objects? * + * Or gives undesired access to variables likes document or window? * + * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * */ + +var $sanitizeMinErr = angular.$$minErr('$sanitize'); + +/** + * @ngdoc module + * @name ngSanitize + * @description + * + * # ngSanitize + * + * The `ngSanitize` module provides functionality to sanitize HTML. + * + * + *
+ * + * See {@link ngSanitize.$sanitize `$sanitize`} for usage. + */ + +/** + * @ngdoc service + * @name $sanitize + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Sanitizes an html string by stripping all potentially dangerous tokens. + * + * The input is sanitized by parsing the HTML into tokens. All safe tokens (from a whitelist) are + * then serialized back to properly escaped html string. This means that no unsafe input can make + * it into the returned string. + * + * The whitelist for URL sanitization of attribute values is configured using the functions + * `aHrefSanitizationWhitelist` and `imgSrcSanitizationWhitelist` of {@link ng.$compileProvider + * `$compileProvider`}. + * + * The input may also contain SVG markup if this is enabled via {@link $sanitizeProvider}. + * + * @param {string} html HTML input. + * @returns {string} Sanitized HTML. + * + * @example + + + +
+ Snippet: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
DirectiveHowSourceRendered
ng-bind-htmlAutomatically uses $sanitize
<div ng-bind-html="snippet">
</div>
ng-bind-htmlBypass $sanitize by explicitly trusting the dangerous value + 
<div ng-bind-html="deliberatelyTrustDangerousSnippet()">
+</div>
+
ng-bindAutomatically escapes
<div ng-bind="snippet">
</div>
+
+ + + it('should sanitize the html snippet by default', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getInnerHtml()). + toBe('

an html\nclick here\nsnippet

'); + }); + + it('should inline raw snippet if bound to a trusted value', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getInnerHtml()). + toBe("

an html\n" + + "click here\n" + + "snippet

"); + }); + + it('should escape snippet without any filter', function() { + expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getInnerHtml()). + toBe("<p style=\"color:blue\">an html\n" + + "<em onmouseover=\"this.textContent='PWN3D!'\">click here</em>\n" + + "snippet</p>"); + }); + + it('should update', function() { + element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); + element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new text'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-sanitize div')).getInnerHtml()). + toBe('new text'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-html-with-trust div')).getInnerHtml()).toBe( + 'new text'); + expect(element(by.css('#bind-default div')).getInnerHtml()).toBe( + "new <b onclick=\"alert(1)\">text</b>"); + }); + + + */ + + +/** + * @ngdoc provider + * @name $sanitizeProvider + * + * @description + * Creates and configures {@link $sanitize} instance. + */ +function $SanitizeProvider() { + var svgEnabled = false; + + this.$get = ['$$sanitizeUri', function($$sanitizeUri) { + if (svgEnabled) { + angular.extend(validElements, svgElements); + } + return function(html) { + var buf = []; + htmlParser(html, htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, function(uri, isImage) { + return !/^unsafe:/.test($$sanitizeUri(uri, isImage)); + })); + return buf.join(''); + }; + }]; + + + /** + * @ngdoc method + * @name $sanitizeProvider#enableSvg + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Enables a subset of svg to be supported by the sanitizer. + * + *
+ *

By enabling this setting without taking other precautions, you might expose your + * application to click-hijacking attacks. In these attacks, sanitized svg elements could be positioned + * outside of the containing element and be rendered over other elements on the page (e.g. a login + * link). Such behavior can then result in phishing incidents.

+ * + *

To protect against these, explicitly setup `overflow: hidden` css rule for all potential svg + * tags within the sanitized content:

+ * + *
+ * + * 

+   *   .rootOfTheIncludedContent svg {
+   *     overflow: hidden !important;
+   *   }
+   *
+ *
+ * + * @param {boolean=} regexp New regexp to whitelist urls with. + * @returns {boolean|ng.$sanitizeProvider} Returns the currently configured value if called + * without an argument or self for chaining otherwise. + */ + this.enableSvg = function(enableSvg) { + if (angular.isDefined(enableSvg)) { + svgEnabled = enableSvg; + return this; + } else { + return svgEnabled; + } + }; +} + +function sanitizeText(chars) { + var buf = []; + var writer = htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, angular.noop); + writer.chars(chars); + return buf.join(''); +} + + +// Regular Expressions for parsing tags and attributes +var SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP = /[\uD800-\uDBFF][\uDC00-\uDFFF]/g, + // Match everything outside of normal chars and " (quote character) + NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP = /([^\#-~ |!])/g; + + +// Good source of info about elements and attributes +// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#semantics +// http://simon.html5.org/html-elements + +// Safe Void Elements - HTML5 +// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#void-elements +var voidElements = toMap("area,br,col,hr,img,wbr"); + +// Elements that you can, intentionally, leave open (and which close themselves) +// http://dev.w3.org/html5/spec/Overview.html#optional-tags +var optionalEndTagBlockElements = toMap("colgroup,dd,dt,li,p,tbody,td,tfoot,th,thead,tr"), + optionalEndTagInlineElements = toMap("rp,rt"), + optionalEndTagElements = angular.extend({}, + optionalEndTagInlineElements, + optionalEndTagBlockElements); + +// Safe Block Elements - HTML5 +var blockElements = angular.extend({}, optionalEndTagBlockElements, toMap("address,article," + + "aside,blockquote,caption,center,del,dir,div,dl,figure,figcaption,footer,h1,h2,h3,h4,h5," + + "h6,header,hgroup,hr,ins,map,menu,nav,ol,pre,section,table,ul")); + +// Inline Elements - HTML5 +var inlineElements = angular.extend({}, optionalEndTagInlineElements, toMap("a,abbr,acronym,b," + + "bdi,bdo,big,br,cite,code,del,dfn,em,font,i,img,ins,kbd,label,map,mark,q,ruby,rp,rt,s," + + "samp,small,span,strike,strong,sub,sup,time,tt,u,var")); + +// SVG Elements +// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Elements +// Note: the elements animate,animateColor,animateMotion,animateTransform,set are intentionally omitted. +// They can potentially allow for arbitrary javascript to be executed. See #11290 +var svgElements = toMap("circle,defs,desc,ellipse,font-face,font-face-name,font-face-src,g,glyph," + + "hkern,image,linearGradient,line,marker,metadata,missing-glyph,mpath,path,polygon,polyline," + + "radialGradient,rect,stop,svg,switch,text,title,tspan"); + +// Blocked Elements (will be stripped) +var blockedElements = toMap("script,style"); + +var validElements = angular.extend({}, + voidElements, + blockElements, + inlineElements, + optionalEndTagElements); + +//Attributes that have href and hence need to be sanitized +var uriAttrs = toMap("background,cite,href,longdesc,src,xlink:href"); + +var htmlAttrs = toMap('abbr,align,alt,axis,bgcolor,border,cellpadding,cellspacing,class,clear,' + + 'color,cols,colspan,compact,coords,dir,face,headers,height,hreflang,hspace,' + + 'ismap,lang,language,nohref,nowrap,rel,rev,rows,rowspan,rules,' + + 'scope,scrolling,shape,size,span,start,summary,tabindex,target,title,type,' + + 'valign,value,vspace,width'); + +// SVG attributes (without "id" and "name" attributes) +// https://wiki.whatwg.org/wiki/Sanitization_rules#svg_Attributes +var svgAttrs = toMap('accent-height,accumulate,additive,alphabetic,arabic-form,ascent,' + + 'baseProfile,bbox,begin,by,calcMode,cap-height,class,color,color-rendering,content,' + + 'cx,cy,d,dx,dy,descent,display,dur,end,fill,fill-rule,font-family,font-size,font-stretch,' + + 'font-style,font-variant,font-weight,from,fx,fy,g1,g2,glyph-name,gradientUnits,hanging,' + + 'height,horiz-adv-x,horiz-origin-x,ideographic,k,keyPoints,keySplines,keyTimes,lang,' + + 'marker-end,marker-mid,marker-start,markerHeight,markerUnits,markerWidth,mathematical,' + + 'max,min,offset,opacity,orient,origin,overline-position,overline-thickness,panose-1,' + + 'path,pathLength,points,preserveAspectRatio,r,refX,refY,repeatCount,repeatDur,' + + 'requiredExtensions,requiredFeatures,restart,rotate,rx,ry,slope,stemh,stemv,stop-color,' + + 'stop-opacity,strikethrough-position,strikethrough-thickness,stroke,stroke-dasharray,' + + 'stroke-dashoffset,stroke-linecap,stroke-linejoin,stroke-miterlimit,stroke-opacity,' + + 'stroke-width,systemLanguage,target,text-anchor,to,transform,type,u1,u2,underline-position,' + + 'underline-thickness,unicode,unicode-range,units-per-em,values,version,viewBox,visibility,' + + 'width,widths,x,x-height,x1,x2,xlink:actuate,xlink:arcrole,xlink:role,xlink:show,xlink:title,' + + 'xlink:type,xml:base,xml:lang,xml:space,xmlns,xmlns:xlink,y,y1,y2,zoomAndPan', true); + +var validAttrs = angular.extend({}, + uriAttrs, + svgAttrs, + htmlAttrs); + +function toMap(str, lowercaseKeys) { + var obj = {}, items = str.split(','), i; + for (i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { + obj[lowercaseKeys ? angular.lowercase(items[i]) : items[i]] = true; + } + return obj; +} + +var inertBodyElement; +(function(window) { + var doc; + if (window.document && window.document.implementation) { + doc = window.document.implementation.createHTMLDocument("inert"); + } else { + throw $sanitizeMinErr('noinert', "Can't create an inert html document"); + } + var docElement = doc.documentElement || doc.getDocumentElement(); + var bodyElements = docElement.getElementsByTagName('body'); + + // usually there should be only one body element in the document, but IE doesn't have any, so we need to create one + if (bodyElements.length === 1) { + inertBodyElement = bodyElements[0]; + } else { + var html = doc.createElement('html'); + inertBodyElement = doc.createElement('body'); + html.appendChild(inertBodyElement); + doc.appendChild(html); + } +})(window); + +/** + * @example + * htmlParser(htmlString, { + * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, + * end: function(tag) {}, + * chars: function(text) {}, + * comment: function(text) {} + * }); + * + * @param {string} html string + * @param {object} handler + */ +function htmlParser(html, handler) { + if (html === null || html === undefined) { + html = ''; + } else if (typeof html !== 'string') { + html = '' + html; + } + inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; + + //mXSS protection + var mXSSAttempts = 5; + do { + if (mXSSAttempts === 0) { + throw $sanitizeMinErr('uinput', "Failed to sanitize html because the input is unstable"); + } + mXSSAttempts--; + + // strip custom-namespaced attributes on IE<=11 + if (document.documentMode <= 11) { + stripCustomNsAttrs(inertBodyElement); + } + html = inertBodyElement.innerHTML; //trigger mXSS + inertBodyElement.innerHTML = html; + } while (html !== inertBodyElement.innerHTML); + + var node = inertBodyElement.firstChild; + while (node) { + switch (node.nodeType) { + case 1: // ELEMENT_NODE + handler.start(node.nodeName.toLowerCase(), attrToMap(node.attributes)); + break; + case 3: // TEXT NODE + handler.chars(node.textContent); + break; + } + + var nextNode; + if (!(nextNode = node.firstChild)) { + if (node.nodeType == 1) { + handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); + } + nextNode = node.nextSibling; + if (!nextNode) { + while (nextNode == null) { + node = node.parentNode; + if (node === inertBodyElement) break; + nextNode = node.nextSibling; + if (node.nodeType == 1) { + handler.end(node.nodeName.toLowerCase()); + } + } + } + } + node = nextNode; + } + + while (node = inertBodyElement.firstChild) { + inertBodyElement.removeChild(node); + } +} + +function attrToMap(attrs) { + var map = {}; + for (var i = 0, ii = attrs.length; i < ii; i++) { + var attr = attrs[i]; + map[attr.name] = attr.value; + } + return map; +} + + +/** + * Escapes all potentially dangerous characters, so that the + * resulting string can be safely inserted into attribute or + * element text. + * @param value + * @returns {string} escaped text + */ +function encodeEntities(value) { + return value. + replace(/&/g, '&'). + replace(SURROGATE_PAIR_REGEXP, function(value) { + var hi = value.charCodeAt(0); + var low = value.charCodeAt(1); + return '&#' + (((hi - 0xD800) * 0x400) + (low - 0xDC00) + 0x10000) + ';'; + }). + replace(NON_ALPHANUMERIC_REGEXP, function(value) { + return '&#' + value.charCodeAt(0) + ';'; + }). + replace(//g, '>'); +} + +/** + * create an HTML/XML writer which writes to buffer + * @param {Array} buf use buf.join('') to get out sanitized html string + * @returns {object} in the form of { + * start: function(tag, attrs) {}, + * end: function(tag) {}, + * chars: function(text) {}, + * comment: function(text) {} + * } + */ +function htmlSanitizeWriter(buf, uriValidator) { + var ignoreCurrentElement = false; + var out = angular.bind(buf, buf.push); + return { + start: function(tag, attrs) { + tag = angular.lowercase(tag); + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && blockedElements[tag]) { + ignoreCurrentElement = tag; + } + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true) { + out('<'); + out(tag); + angular.forEach(attrs, function(value, key) { + var lkey=angular.lowercase(key); + var isImage = (tag === 'img' && lkey === 'src') || (lkey === 'background'); + if (validAttrs[lkey] === true && + (uriAttrs[lkey] !== true || uriValidator(value, isImage))) { + out(' '); + out(key); + out('="'); + out(encodeEntities(value)); + out('"'); + } + }); + out('>'); + } + }, + end: function(tag) { + tag = angular.lowercase(tag); + if (!ignoreCurrentElement && validElements[tag] === true && voidElements[tag] !== true) { + out(''); + } + if (tag == ignoreCurrentElement) { + ignoreCurrentElement = false; + } + }, + chars: function(chars) { + if (!ignoreCurrentElement) { + out(encodeEntities(chars)); + } + } + }; +} + + +/** + * When IE9-11 comes across an unknown namespaced attribute e.g. 'xlink:foo' it adds 'xmlns:ns1' attribute to declare + * ns1 namespace and prefixes the attribute with 'ns1' (e.g. 'ns1:xlink:foo'). This is undesirable since we don't want + * to allow any of these custom attributes. This method strips them all. + * + * @param node Root element to process + */ +function stripCustomNsAttrs(node) { + if (node.nodeType === Node.ELEMENT_NODE) { + var attrs = node.attributes; + for (var i = 0, l = attrs.length; i < l; i++) { + var attrNode = attrs[i]; + var attrName = attrNode.name.toLowerCase(); + if (attrName === 'xmlns:ns1' || attrName.indexOf('ns1:') === 0) { + node.removeAttributeNode(attrNode); + i--; + l--; + } + } + } + + var nextNode = node.firstChild; + if (nextNode) { + stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); + } + + nextNode = node.nextSibling; + if (nextNode) { + stripCustomNsAttrs(nextNode); + } +} + + + +// define ngSanitize module and register $sanitize service +angular.module('ngSanitize', []).provider('$sanitize', $SanitizeProvider); + +/* global sanitizeText: false */ + +/** + * @ngdoc filter + * @name linky + * @kind function + * + * @description + * Finds links in text input and turns them into html links. Supports `http/https/ftp/mailto` and + * plain email address links. + * + * Requires the {@link ngSanitize `ngSanitize`} module to be installed. + * + * @param {string} text Input text. + * @param {string} target Window (`_blank|_self|_parent|_top`) or named frame to open links in. + * @param {object|function(url)} [attributes] Add custom attributes to the link element. + * + * Can be one of: + * + * - `object`: A map of attributes + * - `function`: Takes the url as a parameter and returns a map of attributes + * + * If the map of attributes contains a value for `target`, it overrides the value of + * the target parameter. + * + * + * @returns {string} Html-linkified and {@link $sanitize sanitized} text. + * + * @usage + + * + * @example + + +
+ Snippet: + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
FilterSourceRendered
linky filter + 
<div ng-bind-html="snippet | linky">
</div>
+ 		+
+
linky target + 
<div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'">
</div>
+ 		+
+
linky custom attributes + 
<div ng-bind-html="snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}">
</div>
+ 		+
+
no filter
<div ng-bind="snippet">
</div>
+ + + angular.module('linkyExample', ['ngSanitize']) + .controller('ExampleController', ['$scope', function($scope) { + $scope.snippet = + 'Pretty text with some links:\n'+ + 'http://angularjs.org/,\n'+ + 'mailto:us@somewhere.org,\n'+ + 'another@somewhere.org,\n'+ + 'and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'; + $scope.snippetWithSingleURL = 'http://angularjs.org/'; + }]); + + + it('should linkify the snippet with urls', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). + toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, us@somewhere.org, ' + + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(4); + }); + + it('should not linkify snippet without the linky filter', function() { + expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()). + toBe('Pretty text with some links: http://angularjs.org/, mailto:us@somewhere.org, ' + + 'another@somewhere.org, and one more: ftp://127.0.0.1/.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#escaped-html a')).count()).toEqual(0); + }); + + it('should update', function() { + element(by.model('snippet')).clear(); + element(by.model('snippet')).sendKeys('new http://link.'); + expect(element(by.id('linky-filter')).element(by.binding('snippet | linky')).getText()). + toBe('new http://link.'); + expect(element.all(by.css('#linky-filter a')).count()).toEqual(1); + expect(element(by.id('escaped-html')).element(by.binding('snippet')).getText()) + .toBe('new http://link.'); + }); + + it('should work with the target property', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-target')). + element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_blank'")).getText()). + toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); + expect(element(by.css('#linky-target a')).getAttribute('target')).toEqual('_blank'); + }); + + it('should optionally add custom attributes', function() { + expect(element(by.id('linky-custom-attributes')). + element(by.binding("snippetWithSingleURL | linky:'_self':{rel: 'nofollow'}")).getText()). + toBe('http://angularjs.org/'); + expect(element(by.css('#linky-custom-attributes a')).getAttribute('rel')).toEqual('nofollow'); + }); + + + */ +angular.module('ngSanitize').filter('linky', ['$sanitize', function($sanitize) { + var LINKY_URL_REGEXP = + /((ftp|https?):\/\/|(www\.)|(mailto:)?[A-Za-z0-9._%+-]+@)\S*[^\s.;,(){}<>"\u201d\u2019]/i, + MAILTO_REGEXP = /^mailto:/i; + + var linkyMinErr = angular.$$minErr('linky'); + var isString = angular.isString; + + return function(text, target, attributes) { + if (text == null || text === '') return text; + if (!isString(text)) throw linkyMinErr('notstring', 'Expected string but received: {0}', text); + + var match; + var raw = text; + var html = []; + var url; + var i; + while ((match = raw.match(LINKY_URL_REGEXP))) { + // We can not end in these as they are sometimes found at the end of the sentence + url = match[0]; + // if we did not match ftp/http/www/mailto then assume mailto + if (!match[2] && !match[4]) { + url = (match[3] ? 'http://' : 'mailto:') + url; + } + i = match.index; + addText(raw.substr(0, i)); + addLink(url, match[0].replace(MAILTO_REGEXP, '')); + raw = raw.substring(i + match[0].length); + } + addText(raw); + return $sanitize(html.join('')); + + function addText(text) { + if (!text) { + return; + } + html.push(sanitizeText(text)); + } + + function addLink(url, text) { + var key; + html.push(''); + addText(text); + html.push(''); + } + }; +}]); + + +})(window, window.angular); -- cgit 1.2.3-korg